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The Philadelphia and Houston Police Departments are similarly sized, but
over a recent two-year period, ten times more civil rights suits were filed
against Philadelphia and its officers than were filed against Houston and its
officers. Plaintiffs in cases brought against Philadelphia and its officers were
awarded one hundred times more in settlements and judgments. What ac-
counts for these differences? Although the frequency and severity of miscon-
duct and injury may play some role, I contend that the volume and outcome
of civil rights litigation against any given jurisdiction should be understood
as a product of what I call its civil rights ecosystem.
Scientists define ecosystems as communities of living and nonliving elements
that are interconnected and interactive. I define civil rights ecosystems as col-
lections of actors (including plaintiffs’ attorneys, state and federal judges,
state and federal juries, and defense counsel), legal rules and remedies (in-
cluding state tort law, § 1983 doctrine and defenses, and damages caps), and
informal practices (including litigation, settlement, and indemnification de-
cisions) that are similarly interconnected and interactive. Variation in differ-
ent aspects of a civil rights ecosystem determines the frequency with which
claims against government are brought, the frequency with which those
claims are successful, and the magnitude of their success.
In this Article, I describe some key elements of civil rights ecosystems and the
ways in which these elements interact, wide variation in civil rights ecosys-
tems across the country, and ecosystem feedback loops that can magnify re-
gional variation. Throughout, I illustrate aspects of this framework with
examples drawn from an original dataset of almost 1,200 police misconduct
cases filed in five federal districts around the country and surveys and inter-
views of dozens of attorneys who represented plaintiffs in these cases.
Finally, I consider the implications of these observations. Understanding civil
rights filings and payouts as the product of civil rights ecosystems reveals sig-
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nificant conceptual gaps in § 1983 doctrine and scholarly debate about the
relationship between constitutional rights and remedies; raises important
questions about the mechanics and desirability of regional variation in con-
stitutional protections; and offers insights valuable for courts, advocates, and
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INTRODUCTION
The Philadelphia Police Department and the Houston Police Depart-
ment are the fourth and fifth largest in the country—Philadelphia has 6,031
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sworn officers, and Houston has 5,203.1 Yet, despite their relative similarity
in size, ten times more federal lawsuits were filed against the Philadelphia
Police Department and its officers for constitutional violations than were
filed against the Houston Police Department and its officers during a recent
two-year period.2 Philadelphia plaintiffs recovered 100 times more than
Houston plaintiffs in these cases.3
What accounts for these differences? One might assume that the num-
ber of lawsuits filed against a police department and the cost of settlements
and judgments reflect the frequency and severity of harms inflicted by its of-
ficers. If so, Philadelphia police officers engage in more frequent misconduct,
and far more harmful misconduct, than do Houston police officers. Alt-
hough information about police uses of force and misconduct is hard to
come by,4 available evidence suggests the connection between civil rights
violations and successful lawsuits is not so direct. There are 65% more offic-
ers per 10,000 people in Philadelphia than there are in Houston,5 and a pop-
ulation density almost three times greater,6 which might mean that police
and residents interact more often. But a recent survey found that residents of
Philadelphia and Houston held similar views about the relationship between
their communities and the police.7 And the Department of Justice has re-
1. SHELLEY S. HYLAND & ELIZABETH DAVIS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 252835, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2016: PERSONNEL 14 (2019),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd16p.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BCN-5FYJ].
2. See infra notes 199–200, 203–204 and accompanying text. Two hundred and sixty-
eight lawsuits were filed in federal court against the Philadelphia Police Department and its
officers in 2011–2012; during the same period, just twenty-five suits were filed in federal court
against the Houston Police Department and its officers. Id. For further discussion of these cas-
es, see infra Section II.E.
3. Houston paid $206,500 to settle five federal cases filed against its officers in 2011–
2012; Philadelphia paid almost $22 million to resolve 242 cases filed in state and federal court
filed during the same two-year period. See infra notes 200–202, 204 and accompanying text.
See infra Section II.E for further discussion of these settlements.
4. For a discussion of the lack of data about law enforcement uses of force and mis-
conduct, see, for example, Rachel Harmon, Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing?, 96
MARQ. L. REV. 1119 (2013), and Rachel Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV.
1339, 1361–68 (2018).
5. See HYLAND & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 14 (reporting 38 officers per 10,000 residents
in Philadelphia and 23 officers per 10,000 residents in Houston).
6. See WORLD POPULATION REVIEW, THE 200 LARGEST CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
BY POPULATION 2019 (2019), https://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/ [https://perma.cc
/NMH8-Z98Y]. Houston has a population density of 3,706/mi2 and area of approximately
635mi2. See id. Philadelphia has a population density of 11,750/mi2 and an area of approxi-
mately 135mi2. See id.
7. See Sun-Times Staff, Chicagoans Have a Problem with Police, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Oct.
18, 2018, 11:13 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/chicago-residents-comunity-relation
ship-police-department/ [https://perma.cc/7JWQ-DPVA]. The study found that 76% of Hou-
ston residents believed their communities had a “very” or “somewhat” good relationship with
1542 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:1539
cently investigated several killings and allegations of excessive force by law
enforcement officers in both cities.8
Some evidence suggests that Houston officers actually inflict more harm
than Philadelphia officers. When The Guardian tracked all police killings in
2015 and 2016, it found that Houston police killed 2.5 times as many people
as did Philadelphia police.9 When USA Today collected evidence of officers
who have lost law enforcement certification for misconduct, it found 3.3
times more Houston officers than Philadelphia officers have been decerti-
fied.10 Differences in the frequency and severity of officer misconduct may
explain some variation in lawsuit filings and payouts but do not appear to
tell the whole story in Philadelphia and Houston.11 And similar disparities
can be seen across the country.12
the police, as compared to 69% of Philadelphia residents, and that 16% of surveyed residents
from both cities described community-police relations as “very” or “somewhat” bad. Id.
8. See Trymaine Lee, DOJ Report Reveals Problem-Plagued Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment, MSNBC (Mar. 23, 2015, 5:23 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/doj-report-
philadelphia-police-department [https://perma.cc/5UBD-CZXS]; James Pinkerton, Six HPD
Cases Investigated by Justice Department, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 4, 2012), https://www
.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Six-HPD-cases-investigated-by-
Justice-Department-4091408.php [https://perma.cc/K537-AAN6].
9. See The Counted, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive
/2015/jun/01/the-counted-police-killings-us-database (last visited Dec. 3, 2019) (reporting that
Houston officers killed twenty-eight people in 2015–2016, and Philadelphia officers killed elev-
en people in 2015–2016). The Washington Post, which has tracked fatal police shootings since
January 1, 2015, reports that Houston officers fatally shot forty-six people and Philadelphia
officers fatally shot fifteen people during that period. Fatal Force, WASH. POST,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-shootings-2016/ [https://perma.cc
/AC9Y-TK5E]. For an earlier report finding Houston police killed more people per year than
police in larger departments including Los Angeles and Chicago, see James Pinkerton, Bullet-
proof: Part 1: Unarmed and Dangerous, HOUS. CHRON., https://www.chron.com/local
/investigations/item/Bulletproof-Part-1-24419.php [https://perma.cc/7T7F-S3YT].
10. See John Kelly & Mark Nichols, Search the List of More than 30,000 Police Officers
Banned by 44 States, USA TODAY (Apr. 24, 2019, 9:16 PM) (updated Oct. 14, 2019, 8:26 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/04/24/biggest-collection-
police-accountability-records-ever-assembled/2299127002/ [https://perma.cc/636W-EE6C].
USA Today found sixty-nine Houston officers and twenty-one Philadelphia officers have been
decertified for misconduct. Id.
11. Note that killings tracked by The Guardian described supra in note 9 post-date the
lawsuit payouts described supra in notes 2–3, and the decertifications tracked by USA Today
described supra in note 10 appear to have occurred over many years. These temporal dispari-
ties are an unfortunate byproduct of the general lack of reliable data about police behavior. As
a result, I cannot precisely compare the behavior of Philadelphia and Houston police officers in
the years leading up to and including 2011–2012, when the civil lawsuits in my study were
filed.
12. For example, the San Antonio and Boston Police Departments are similarly sized—
in 2016, San Antonio had 2,244 officers and Boston had 2,099 officers. See HYLAND & DAVIS,
supra note 1, at 14. In 2015 and 2016, San Antonio officers killed almost three times more peo-
ple than Boston officers. See The Counted, supra note 9. Yet Boston paid 9.8 times more to re-
solve civil rights suits against its officers than did San Antonio during a six-year period from
2006 to 2011. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 963
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In this Article, I contend that whether a person seeks redress for viola-
tions of their civil rights, whether they succeed, and the magnitude of their
success depends in significant part upon what I call the civil rights ecosystem
in which the claim arose. Scientists define ecosystems as communities of liv-
ing and nonliving elements that are interconnected and interactive.13 Civil
rights ecosystems are similarly interconnected and interactive collections of
people (including plaintiffs’ attorneys, community organizers and activists,
state and federal judges, state and federal juries, local government officials,
and defense counsel), legal rules and remedies (including state tort law,
§ 1983 doctrine and defenses, and damages caps), and informal practices
(including litigation, settlement, and indemnification decisions).
Understanding lawsuit filings and outcomes as products of civil rights
ecosystems illuminates three important observations about the dynamics of
civil rights litigation.14 First, as in other types of ecosystems, civil rights eco-
(2014). The Albuquerque Police Department and the Oklahoma Police Department are simi-
larly sized—in 2016, Albuquerque had 821 officers and Oklahoma City had 1,101 officers. See
HYLAND & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 14 (reporting size of the Oklahoma City Police Depart-
ment); Elise Kaplan, APD Added 116 Officers over Past Year, ALBUQUERQUE J. (June 17, 2019,
7:25 PM), https://www.abqjournal.com/1329712/apd-added-116-officers-over-past-year.html
[https://perma.cc/KE5N-Y5RA] (reporting size of the Albuquerque Police Department). In
2015 and 2016, Oklahoma City officers killed thirteen people, and Albuquerque officers killed
five. The Counted, supra note 9. Yet Albuquerque paid 64.6 times more to resolve civil rights
lawsuits against its officers than did Oklahoma City from 2006 to 2011. See Schwartz, supra at
964. The Atlanta Police Department and the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department are
similarly sized—in 2016, Atlanta had 1,730 officers and Charlotte-Mecklenberg had 1,743 of-
ficers. See HYLAND & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 14. In 2015 and 2016, Charlotte-Mecklenberg of-
ficers killed seven people, and Atlanta officers killed four. The Counted, supra note 9. Yet
Atlanta paid 10.5 times more to resolve civil rights lawsuits against its officers than did Char-
lotte-Mecklenberg from 2006 to 2011. See Schwartz, supra at 963. I could go on, but you get the
point.
13. See, e.g., KATHLEEN C. WEATHERS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOSYSTEM SCIENCE
3–8 (2013).
14. The ecosystem metaphor has often been used—perhaps overused—to describe com-
plex interactions of people, rules, and practices in business, technology, and other areas. Nev-
ertheless, I adopt the ecosystem metaphor here because it is particularly useful to advance the
descriptive claims I make in this Article. For discussion of the reasons an “ecosystem” frame-
work is more apt than a “system” framework to describe dynamics in civil rights litigation, see
infra notes 15–17. For examples of the ecosystem metaphor used in other contexts see, for ex-
ample, Brandon Buskey & Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Keeping Gideon’s Promise: Using Equal Pro-
tection to Address the Denial of Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2299,
2315 (2017), for a description of “toxic judicial ecosystems where 70 percent of criminal de-
fendants plead guilty without counsel in proceedings that often last under three minutes”; Bri-
an Cummings, The Changing Landscape of Intellectual Property Management as a Revenue-
Generating Asset for U.S. Research Universities, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1027, 1037 (2014), for
a usage of the ecosystem analogy to describe “all of the parties and procedures involved in the
process of carrying an invention from initial idea to the marketplace”; Marco Iansiti & Gregory
L. Richards, The Information Technology Ecosystem: Structure, Health, and Performance, 51
ANTITRUST BULL. 77, 77 (2006), for a description of “the IT ecosystem, by which we mean the
network of organizations that drives the delivery of information technology products and ser-
vices”; James F. Moore, Predators and Prey: A New Ecology of Competition, HARV. BUS. REV.,
May–June 1993, at 75, 76, for a description of businesses “as part of a business ecosystem that
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systems are multifaceted and their component parts are interdependent.15
Whether a civil rights lawsuit is filed and the outcome of the case turns in
part on federal courts’ application of doctrines relevant to § 1983 claims, in-
cluding the scope of constitutional rights, the availability of immunities,
standing, and pleading. But whether a civil rights lawsuit is filed and success-
ful also depends on myriad people, rules, and practices far beyond the pur-
view of federal judges, including the availability of state court remedies as a
supplement or alternative to a § 1983 claim; the perspectives and practices of
state judges; the sympathies of community members who may serve as state
or federal jurors; the settlement and litigation practices of defense counsel;
the ability to collect any settlement or judgment, which can be affected by
damages caps, refusals to indemnify, or municipal budget shortfalls; and the
availability of plaintiffs’ attorneys willing to take civil rights cases who can
skillfully navigate these complexities.
Second, just as some natural ecosystems are friendlier to plant and ani-
mal life than others, some civil rights ecosystems are friendlier to civil rights
suits than others.16 In some places, plaintiffs seeking to sue government offi-
cials have their choice of state and federal law claims and can bring their cas-
es in state or federal court, consider their judges and juries to be relatively
sympathetic, and are virtually assured any award will be paid in full by the
jurisdiction. In other places, there are limited or no state law causes of ac-
tion, judges and juries more hostile to civil rights claims, and more limited
government indemnification. As a result, a lawsuit concerning a constitu-
crosses a variety of industries”; and Margo Schlanger, Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails,
Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165, 167 (2013), for an exploration of
“pertinent features of the relevant legal and political ecosystem in which [post-Plata prison
reduction] changes are taking place” (footnote omitted).
15. See, e.g., WEATHERS ET AL., supra note 13, at 11 (“Unlike systems like the solar sys-
tem, the dynamics of which are controlled by just a few factors, ecosystem structure and func-
tion depend on many factors.”). In this way, the ecosystem framework takes account of and
responds to criticisms of the criminal justice “system” framework for falsely suggesting that
wide-ranging criminal justice actors are engaged in some sort of coordinated behavior. For
further discussion of this critique, see Benjamin Levin, Rethinking the Boundaries of “Criminal
Justice,” 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619 (2018) (reviewing THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING
(Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017)), and Sara Mayeux, The Idea of “the Crim-
inal Justice System,” 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55 (2018).
16. The notion that the scope of civil rights protections is dictated in part by geography
builds conceptually on related work in sociology, criminology, and other disciplines. See, e.g.,
Anthony E. Bottoms, Place, Space, Crime, and Disorder, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
CRIMINOLOGY 528 (Mike Maguire et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007); URIE BRONFENBRENNER, THE
ECOLOGY OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1979); Medical Geography, THE DICTIONARY OF HUMAN
GEOGRAPHY (Derek Gregory et al. eds., 5th ed. 2009); Richard Morrill, Spatial Equity, in 23
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 148–51 (James D.
Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). Because the ecosystem metaphor emphasizes that civil rights are
“produced by specific and local histories and individuals” and “that its component and pur-
portedly analogous parts often do not resemble or act like each other (every unhappy police
department is unhappy in its own way),” it improves on the “criminal justice system” framing
in this way as well. Mayeux, supra note 15, at 60.
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tional violation that would result in a substantial plaintiff’s victory in one
ecosystem might never be filed in another.
Third, as in other types of ecosystems, civil rights ecosystems have feed-
back loops and can evolve.17 Each civil rights lawsuit produces infor-
mation—about defense counsel’s and plaintiff’s counsel’s skill and success,
the judge’s rulings before and during trial, the jury’s sympathy for the plain-
tiff, and the jurisdiction’s willingness to indemnify. This information then
informs lawyers’, judges’, and jurisdictions’ decisions about how to approach
future cases which will, in turn, influence the outcomes of those future cases.
And the outcomes of those future cases will impact attorneys’, judges’, and
jurisdictions’ next decisions. Sometimes, changes to one aspect of the ecosys-
tem will lead to a counterbalancing change to another aspect of the ecosys-
tem—as one element in the ecosystem becomes more defendant-friendly,
another element in the ecosystem becomes more plaintiff-friendly, and the
environment remains relatively stable. Other times, changes to one aspect of
an ecosystem can prompt changes to other aspects of the ecosystem that am-
plify rather than balance, dramatically shifting its friendliness or hostility to
civil rights litigation over time.
Understanding civil rights filings and payouts as products of the ecosys-
tems in which the claims arose not only helps illuminate the dynamics of
constitutional litigation but also reveals important gaps in several ongoing
debates. When the Supreme Court crafts constitutional rules, procedural
hurdles, and immunity doctrines, it appears to believe its rulings operate in a
vacuum to achieve balance between governmental and individual interests.18
Scholars debating the proper scope of constitutional rights and the relation-
ship between rights and remedies similarly focus predominantly on the work
of federal judges interpreting federal law. But civil rights ecosystems are gov-
erned by a whole range of influences far beyond federal courts’ control. A
constitutional right may exist in the eyes of a federal judge, but if no case will
be filed to vindicate that right—either because there would be no money to
satisfy the judgment or because there is no active plaintiffs’ bar willing to
17. Constitutional and social movements scholars have long observed that constitution-
al rights evolve through feedback effects between courts and social movement actors. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional
Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006). Complexity theory also recognizes feedback effects in complex
systems that can produce substantial and dramatic change. See, e.g., Sylvia Walby, Complexity
Theory, Systems Theory, and Multiple Intersecting Social Inequalities, 37 PHIL. SOC. SCI. 449
(2007). The “systems” framework in criminal justice has been criticized for connoting “some-
thing that is by its nature somewhat generic, dynamic only within a broadly stable structure or
equilibrium rather than transforming dramatically over time, and thus, susceptible to descrip-
tion in ahistorical terms.” Mayeux, supra note 15, at 60. The ecosystem metaphor, in contrast,
emphasizes the existence and mechanics of change. See Moore, supra note 14, at 75–76 (em-
phasizing evolution as a key characteristic of business and natural ecosystems).
18. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
1546 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 118:1539
take the case—it will not be meaningfully protected.19 On the other hand, a
plaintiff can prevail even if a federal court concludes no constitutional right
exists—so long as a parallel state law claim is available, plaintiff’s counsel is
savvy enough to know to bring the state law claim, and there are funds avail-
able to satisfy an award. As this Article makes clear, a complete understand-
ing of constitutional rights and remedies must take account of a whole range
of interacting people, rules, and practices that have, until now, largely es-
caped judicial and scholarly attention.
Understanding civil rights litigation as the product of distinct ecosys-
tems additionally illuminates the existence, cause, and scope of regional vari-
ation in protections against government violence and overreach. Although
the Supreme Court has regularly described constitutional rights as consistent
across the country, this Article makes clear that, in practice, the Fourth
Amendment offers very different sanctuary for residents of Philadelphia and
Houston. Regional variation in constitutional protections is not necessarily a
bad thing. Scholars have argued that law enforcement and other government
actors should be guided by community preferences and norms.20 I endorse
some ongoing efforts to engage community members in the tailoring of con-
stitutional protections and rules.21 But understanding localities as civil rights
ecosystems, and seeing some of those ecosystems at work, also raises cause
for concern. Those supportive of localism usually imagine that adjustments
to constitutional protections will only expand rights above a constitutional
floor.22 Instead, it appears that, in some ecosystems, constitutional protec-
tions are being dramatically underenforced—and thus, as a practical matter,
are virtually nonexistent.
Finally, understanding civil rights litigation as the product of distinct
ecosystems offers insights for courts, legislators, and advocates about the
ability to engineer changes in civil rights protections. The complexity and
interconnected nature of civil rights ecosystems, and their regional variation,
make it nearly impossible to design generally applicable legal rules that
achieve precise policy goals or have a consistent impact. On the other hand,
the ecosystem metaphor makes clear that the scope and strength of civil
rights protections are not set in stone. A modest alteration to one aspect of
an ecosystem can spur changes that dramatically impact a jurisdiction’s
amenability to civil rights litigation over time. For those attempting to engi-
neer such a shift, it is critically important to understand the characteristics of
people, rules, and practices in any given ecosystem and the ways in which
they interact; to recognize that different ecosystems may respond in different
19. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS 19 (2000) (“A
legal right exists, in reality, only when and if it has budgetary costs.”); Douglas Laycock, How
Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161, 165 (2008) (“A right with no effective
remedy is unenforceable and largely illusory.”).
20. See infra notes 293–297 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 299–300 and accompanying text.
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ways to the same intervention; and to watch for feedback effects that will in-
evitably occur.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. In the first three Parts,
I describe three key characteristics of civil rights ecosystems—their multiple,
interdependent features (Part I), marked variation in ecosystems across the
country (Part II), and the feedback loops that can dramatically change eco-
systems over time (Part III). To illustrate each of these characteristics, I draw
on original research examining civil rights litigation against law enforcement
across the country. 23 Finally, in Part IV, I consider the ways in which the ex-
istence of varied civil rights ecosystems should inform ongoing judicial and
scholarly discourse about the scope of constitutional rights and the relation-
ship between constitutional rights and remedies; the existence, magnitude,
and desirability of regional variation in constitutional protections; and the
ability to adjust the scope and success of civil rights litigation.
I. CIVIL RIGHTS ECOSYSTEMS: A PROVISIONAL MODEL
Animals, plants, soil, sunlight, and water combine to form natural eco-
systems around the globe. Litigation can also be understood as an ecosystem.
Instead of the animals, plants, and abiotic elements that populate natural
ecosystems, litigation ecosystems are made up of interconnected and inter-
acting causes of action, substantive and procedural rules, attorneys, judges,
23. As is described in more depth in previous work, I examined the dockets of police
misconduct cases filed from 2011 to 2012 in five federal districts—the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of Ohio, the Middle District
of Florida, and the Southern District of Texas—taking note of the number of cases filed, how
frequently plaintiffs filed cases without counsel, the motions brought in each case and their
resolutions, and the ultimate dispositions of the cases. For a detailed description of my meth-
odology in this study, see Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2
(2017) [hereinafter Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails]. I then surveyed and interviewed
dozens of plaintiffs’ attorneys who entered appearances in these cases to better understand the
dynamics of civil rights litigation in these jurisdictions. For a detailed description of my meth-
odology in this study, see Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, 114 NW.
U. L. REV. 1101 (2020) [hereinafter Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects]. I supple-
mented this research with publicly available data and responses to public records requests
about the jurisdictions that receive particular attention in this Article—Philadelphia, Houston,
Cleveland, Oakland, and Orlando. I chose these five regions because other commentators have
suggested, and my own research confirms, that they vary significantly in their receptivity to
civil rights cases. See Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra at 19 (describing evidence
of this variation). And my focus on suits against law enforcement agencies allows for direct
comparisons between them. See id. at 22 (discussing further the rationale for this decision). But
there are limitations of the study design, as there are of any empirical study. For example, I
cannot prove that these five districts capture the entire range of variation in civil rights ecosys-
tems. See id. at 23–25 (describing this limitation of the study). And my reliance on court filings
and lawyers’ perspectives offers less insight about contributors to civil rights ecosystems that
do not engage directly with the legal system. See infra notes 25–37. Further research should
explore aspects of civil rights ecosystems further removed from the courts and civil rights eco-
systems in other parts of the country and the world. See infra notes 319–320 (describing the
need for more research in these areas). Nevertheless, these data offer important initial insights
about the existence of and variation in civil rights ecosystems.
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and juries. Here, I focus on one type of litigation ecosystem—what I call a
civil rights ecosystem—where civil rights claims against government officials
are filed, litigated, and resolved. And I focus on one type of government ac-
tor—law enforcement—against whom civil rights suits are frequently
brought.24 In this Part, I offer an overview of some of the people, rules, and
practices that make up civil rights ecosystems—including plaintiffs’ attor-
neys; state and federal judges; state and federal juries; defense counsel;
§ 1983 doctrine and defenses; state tort law; damages caps; and litigation, set-
tlement, and indemnification decisions. I then show how the interaction of
these elements may determine whether a police misconduct claim is ever
filed, whether it succeeds, and the magnitude of its success.
This overview is in many ways incomplete. Many additional factors in-
fluence whether a person who believes their rights have been violated ever
files a civil rights case or is successful. For example, local rules about gov-
ernment data collection and retention may impact plaintiffs’ abilities to un-
earth documents that can prove wrongdoing.25 Local prosecutors’ reliance
on release-dismissal agreements can prevent potential plaintiffs from pursu-
ing their claims.26 A community’s history of racial segregation, class inequal-
ity, and political mobilization may impact the willingness of potential
plaintiffs to come forward, the response of the community to incidents of
misconduct, and the perspectives of juries and judges who might hear a
case.27
For a complete understanding of the ways in which civil rights protec-
tions are created and enforced, one would need an even broader perspec-
tive.28 Police department policy, training, patrol, supervision, and
disciplinary decisions may all influence the frequency with which officers vi-
24. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 23, at 22. For further discussion
of this methodological choice, see supra note 23.
25. For state laws governing the disclosure of police misconduct records, see Robert
Lewis et al., Is Police Misconduct a Secret in Your State?, WNYC (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.wnyc.org/story/police-misconduct-records/ [https://perma.cc/Q7Z8-FTG5]. For
discussion of the ways in which state laws frustrate efforts to test police credibility in criminal
cases, see Moran, supra note 4.
26. For a discussion of release-dismissal agreements, whereby people give up their right
to sue in exchange for dismissal of criminal charges against them, and the ways in which such
agreements are barriers to police accountability, see Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Police
Misconduct and Release-Dismissal Agreements, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2018, at 31.
27. For a discussion of the role of “bottom-up forms of participation” in criminal justice
reform, see Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Re-
sistance, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609 (2017). For a discussion of the effects of legal estrangement
by poor people of color on police reform movements, see Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the
Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2069–72, 2107–08 (2017). For a discus-
sion of the ways in which recent incidents of police violence and criminal justice activism may
affect decisionmaking by judges and other political actors, see Monica C. Bell, Response, Hid-
den Laws of the Time of Ferguson, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 7–8 (2018).
28. For discussion of the many actors, agencies, and rules beyond the courts that make
up the criminal process see, for example, Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction
to THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 15, at 1, 1–30.
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olate residents’ civil rights.29 The conduct of police officers may be influ-
enced by a number of other factors as well, including the power of the police
officer’s union, the engagement of activists around issues of government ac-
countability, the nature of local government oversight over the police, and
the funding dedicated to hiring and training officers.30 Policing practices ad-
ditionally turn on deeper social forces including racial bias, segregation, and
gentrification that may vary by degree from place to place.31 And those social
forces can be fostered by any number of institutions and actors, including
public school systems, housing policies, and government assistance pro-
grams.32
Civil rights litigation can play multiple roles in shaping and enforcing
civil rights protections: Court decisions can guide policies and trainings,33
and high-profile cases can mobilize activists who can put political pressure
on local government officials who might, in response, renegotiate union
agreements, create police oversight bodies, or adjust police practices.34 Vari-
29. See, e.g., Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA.
L. REV. 211, 250–52, 280–86 (2017) (exploring the relationship between police use of force pol-
icies and police behavior); Stephen Rushin & Atticus DeProspo, Interrogating Police Officers,
87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 671–84 (2019) (exploring procedural protections for officers fac-
ing disciplinary charges and the widespread view that these protections undermine accounta-
bility efforts).
30. For scholarship that explores some of these issues, see, for example, SAMUEL E.
WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (3d ed. 2020)
(exploring various models of police oversight and their role in reform); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,
WHEN POLICE KILL 184, 243–45 (2017) (describing how political activism, funding constraints,
and local government oversight can improve accountability); and Stephen Rushin, Police Un-
ion Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191 (2017) (exploring the relationship between police union
agreements and police misconduct).
31. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of
the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1483–84, 1484 fig.1 (2016) (describing the effects of bias, segre-
gation, and inequality on police violence).
32. See Dolovich & Natapoff, supra note 28, at 13–14 (discussing these components of
the criminal justice system).
33. For a discussion of the ways in which constitutional rights are articulated in the
criminal and civil justice systems, see Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405 (2012).
For discussion of the ways in which courts’ announcement of new rights can inform policies
and trainings, see Joanna C. Schwartz, After Qualified Immunity, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 309,
358–59 (2020); David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
567, 580–81 (2008); Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1121, 1123–24 (2001).
34. See, e.g., Ted Alcorn, Who Will Hold the Police Accountable?, ATLANTIC (July 25,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/07/battle-over-police-accountability
/594484/ [https://perma.cc/RD5M-293Z] (describing advocacy efforts following the police
shooting of Jocques Clemmons in Nashville); Ben Austen, Chicago After Laquan McDonald,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/24/magazine/chicago-after-
laquan-mcdonald.html [https://perma.cc/RS2M-GQ2N] (describing political pressures and
changes in Chicago following release of the video of the shooting of Laquan McDonald); John
Eligon & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Baltimore After Freddie Gray: The ‘Mind-Set Has Changed,’ N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/13/us/baltimore-freddie-gray.html
[https://perma.cc/FLL5-JBTK].
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ous forces—including officer indemnification, officials’ inattention to the
allegations and evidence in civil rights suits, and the insulation of law en-
forcement agencies from the financial consequences of their officers’ mis-
conduct—can likewise diminish the effect of civil rights litigation on
government behavior.35 And cases finding constitutional violations but
granting officers qualified immunity can be understood as a message con-
doning violence and overreach.36 But courts are just one of many influences
on law enforcement behavior and should be understood as just one piece of a
much larger puzzle.37
This Article does not attempt to map all of the influences on civil rights
and their enforcement. Its lack of engagement with these broader questions
should not be understood as a suggestion that they are unimportant. But this
Article has a narrower scope: it focuses on the work of the courts and offers
an account of a handful of people, rules, and practices that most directly play
a role in whether a person who believes their civil rights have been violated
files a lawsuit and is successful. Accordingly, the Sections that follow de-
scribe the characteristics of various federal and state causes of action that
may be available to plaintiffs; federal and state judges and juries that may
consider a case; defendants who, with their lawyers, make consequential de-
cisions about litigation, settlement, and indemnification; and the existence of
plaintiffs’ attorneys able and willing to bring civil rights cases. A final Section
explores the interaction of these elements.
A. Causes of Action
Critically important to any civil rights ecosystem are the available causes
of action. There are, generally speaking, three types of claims. First, a plain-
tiff can file an action against an individual officer under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violating her constitutional rights.38 Second, a plaintiff can file a § 1983 claim
against the municipality—often referred to as a Monell claim—alleging that a
municipal custom or policy caused the violation.39 If a plaintiff sues an indi-
vidual officer under § 1983, she must be able to show that the officer violated
the Constitution and be able to defeat qualified immunity, which protects
35. For further discussion of the ways in which these bureaucratic arrangements can
undermine government accountability, see generally Schwartz, supra note 33 (describing the
many barriers to relief that would remain if qualified immunity were limited or abolished).
36. See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern that the Court’s decision “sends an alarming signal to law enforcement
officers . . . that they can shoot first and think later”); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316
(2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s qualified immunity decisions for
“sanctioning a ‘shoot first, think later’ approach to policing”).
37. For one model of the ways in which police behavior, legal sanctions, and these other
forces may interact, see Carbado, supra note 31, at 1484.
38. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
39. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91.
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government defendants from damages liability so long as defendants did not
violate clearly established law.40 If a plaintiff brings a Monell claim, she must
show that an unlawful policy or a custom or practice of unconstitutional be-
havior led to the violation of her rights, but she need not worry about quali-
fied immunity because municipalities are not entitled to the defense.41 If a
plaintiff wants injunctive relief, she must show that her constitutional rights
are likely to be violated again by the defendant.42 If the plaintiff prevails on
her § 1983 claims against the officer and/or municipality, she can recover
damages and attorneys’ fees.43
Although the United States Supreme Court has issued decisions that
provide guidance regarding each of these aspects of § 1983 litigation, circuit
and district courts have interpreted these doctrines in different ways that
lead to variation in the scope of constitutional rights, the protective power of
qualified immunity, and the proof necessary to establish municipal liabil-
ity.44
Third, in many jurisdictions, an officer can also be sued for state torts
that arise from the same facts as constitutional claims—including assault,
40. For an overview of the meaning of “clearly established law,” see, for example, Joanna
C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797, 1814–16
(2018).
41. See Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Madness,
23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 914–20 (2015) (providing overview of various Monell theo-
ries of liability and their challenges); id. at 913 n.6 (noting that municipalities cannot assert
qualified immunity).
42. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). For discussion of the challenges
associated with proving standing for injunctive claims, see, for example, Sunita Patel, Jumping
Hurdles to Sue the Police, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), and David Rudovsky, Run-
ning in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
1199, 1235–36.
43. A plaintiff can be awarded compensatory and punitive damages against an individu-
al officer, see Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983), but cannot recover punitive damages against a
municipality, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). For a discussion
of § 1988, which authorizes fee shifting in § 1983 cases, and challenges recovering fees, see, for
example, Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1
(2008).
44. For scholarship examining variation in courts’ interpretations of constitutional
rights, qualified immunity, and municipal liability see, for example, Barbara Kritchevsky,
Reexamining Monell: Basing § 1983 Municipal Liability Doctrine on the Statutory Language, 31
URB. LAW. 437, 459–72 (1999) (describing several areas of confusion and variation among cir-
cuit courts regarding Monell liability); Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional Cacophony: Federal
Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137 (2012) (describing circuit
splits in Fourth Amendment doctrine); Cara McClellan, Dismantling the Trap: Untangling the
Chain of Events in Excessive Force Claims, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2017) (describing circuit
variation in interpretations of Fourth Amendment excessive force doctrine); and Charles R.
Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity De-
fense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445 (2000) (describing circuit variation regarding the defi-
nition of “clearly established law”).
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battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence.45 The opportunities
and challenges associated with state law claims vary from state to state. Some
states allow plaintiffs to sue individual government employees; other states
additionally allow plaintiffs to hold government entities vicariously liable for
the torts of their employees.46 Some states cap damages for state tort claims
or prohibit the award of punitive damages.47 Some states allow the award of
attorneys’ fees and others do not.48 Notice of claim requirements and appli-
cable statutes of limitations also vary from state to state.49
B. Decisionmakers
Other important parts of civil rights ecosystems are the judge and jury
who might be assigned to hear the case. Judges decide motions that deter-
mine whether a plaintiff can proceed. Judges can also influence a case’s out-
come through more managerial decisions—the schedule for mediation, what
discovery is reasonable, and whether discovery will be stayed while a motion
is pending. Judges also decide what evidence a jury will hear and what in-
structions they will receive. Juries might not seem central to civil rights eco-
systems, given the infrequency with which civil rights cases go to trial.50 But,
45. See, e.g., infra notes 134–135 (describing state tort causes of action available under
Pennsylvania law); infra notes 157–159 (describing the unavailability of state tort causes of ac-
tion under Texas law).
46. See Lisa D. Hawke, Municipal Liability and Respondeat Superior: An Empirical Study
and Analysis, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 831, 848 (2005) (reporting the results of a survey of small,
medium, and large cities in the United States and finding that “about half of the cities accept
respondeat superior liability under state law for misconduct by individual police officers”).
47. For research about cities’ caps on the indemnification of damages awards, see id. at
848 (finding that “several of the cities” capped awards and the majority of the caps ranged from
$100,000 to $500,000). For research on indemnification prohibitions for punitive damages, see
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 906 (describing jurisdictions that prohibit indemnification of puni-
tive damages awards).
48. For example, California allows for the award of attorneys’ fees for claims brought
under its civil rights statutes. See Matthew S. McNicholas & Holly Boyer, The Bane Act and
Beyond, ADVOCATE, Apr. 2017, at 48. For an earlier study of fee shifting statutes across the
country, see Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American
Rule?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 321.
49. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (holding that statutes of limitations for
§ 1983 claims should be borrowed from state personal injury law). For variation in state stat-
utes of limitations, see MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS FOR
ALL 50 STATES (2020), https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/SOL-
CHART.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV2A-8YPW] (setting out statutes of limitations ranging from
one to six years for personal injury claims). These statutes of limitations would apply to both
§ 1983 claims and state tort claims. For variation in notice of claim requirements, compare, for
example, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 911.2 (West 2012 & Supp. 2020) (requiring that a notice of claim
be filed within six months of occurrence), with N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-e (McKinney 2016
& Supp. 2020) (requiring that a notice of claim be filed within ninety days of occurrence).
50. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). For the trial rate
June 2020] Civil Rights Ecosystems 1553
in the rare event of a trial, juries play a critical role because they determine
whether a plaintiff prevails and what they receive. Past and predicted rulings
and awards may also inform settlement negotiations.51
Judges can differ considerably in their approaches to substantive and
procedural questions relevant to civil rights litigation,52 and local communi-
ties—from which juries are drawn—can vary considerably in their sympa-
thies toward government defendants and civil rights plaintiffs. This variation
among decisionmakers can lead to pronounced differences in courts’ rulings
and juries’ liability findings and damages awards. In the opinion of one law-
yer I interviewed who brings cases all over the United States, “[j]uries vary
by personality and region” and “[t]he judges are probably the biggest varia-
ble” that distinguishes civil rights litigation practice in different parts of the
country.53
Judges and juries in both federal and state court can play important roles
in civil rights ecosystems. Attorneys I interviewed agreed that if a case that
includes § 1983 claims is filed in state court, defendants will usually remove
the case to federal court.54 But if a plaintiff alleges only state law claims, the
case will remain in state court. There are often substantive differences in the
among the cases in my docket dataset, see Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note
23, at 46 tbl.12.
51. For a similar observation about the role of jurors in criminal prosecutions, see Anna
Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1071 (2019).
52. See supra note 44; see also, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary
Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 591, 591 (2004) (“[E]vidence that the [summary judgment] termination and oth-
er activity rates vary, sometimes dramatically, among courts and case types.”). Judge character-
istics may also influence litigant behavior. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary
Judgment Empirics: The Life of the Parties, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1687 (2014) (“[J]udge char-
acteristics are likely significant determinants of whether a litigant will file a motion for sum-
mary judgment in a civil rights case . . . .”).
53. Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney E (Dec. 6, 2017) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review).
54. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney E (May 4, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (agreeing that if he filed a § 1983 case in state court it would be
removed to federal court); Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney C (Nov. 13,
2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“If you didn’t file [§ 1983 cases] in federal court,
they’d be removed anyway.”); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney B (Oct. 23,
2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (explaining that plaintiffs who file federal claims
in state court “end up getting removed to federal court . . . that’s just the typical first move by
cities and counties”); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney G (Apr. 28, 2017) (on
file with the Michigan Law Review) (reporting that “most” federal cases filed in state court “are
just removed right away to federal court”); Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney A
(Apr. 25, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“If you allege a federal cause of action,
I cannot see any defense attorney that I know ever not removing that to federal court any-
way.”). The remainder of the Article contains several excerpts from attorney interviews. The
transcription service for those interviews made several grammatical errors. For ease of reading,
I have corrected those errors. Deviations from the transcription service will not be noted in-
line.
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proof required for parallel state and federal claims.55 There can also be
marked differences in the remedies available—in some states, plaintiffs
bringing state law claims can recover the same damages and attorneys’ fees
as they could with a § 1983 claim; in others, plaintiffs will limit the damages
they can recover and their entitlement to attorneys’ fees by not including
§ 1983 claims in their case.56 In some jurisdictions, forgoing federal claims
means avoiding a drawn-out fight about qualified immunity.57 In other ju-
risdictions, qualified immunity does not pose much of a threat.58 Federal and
state courts can also have different rules governing pleadings, discovery,
summary judgment practice, interlocutory appeals, and the like.59
The choice of state or federal court will also impact which decisionmak-
ers hear the case. State and federal judges are chosen through different pro-
cesses, have different tenures, and may have different degrees of familiarity
with civil rights litigation.60 State and federal juries in cases against the same
government entity can also be very different; federal juries are drawn from
across the federal district, whereas state juries are drawn from the geograph-
ically smaller county.61 Federal and state jury pools can be drawn from dif-
55. See, e.g., infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (describing differences in the
proof of parallel state and federal claims in Ohio); infra notes 135–139 and accompanying text
(describing differences in the proof of parallel state and federal claims in Pennsylvania).
56. See, e.g., infra notes 94, 136, 245–246, 251–252 and accompanying text (describing
differences in the availability of attorneys’ fees for state law claims in Ohio, Pennsylvania, Cali-
fornia, and Florida).
57. See infra notes 248–250 and accompanying text (describing Florida lawyers’ deci-
sions to file state law claims to avoid litigating qualified immunity).
58. See infra notes 120–127 and accompanying text (describing the limited role qualified
immunity plays in the litigation of constitutional claims in Philadelphia).
59. See, e.g., Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L.
REV. 411 (2018) (describing many states’ rejection of Roberts Court pleading, summary judg-
ment, and standing decisions); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney A (May 8,
2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (explaining that plaintiffs have sixty-one days to
respond to a summary judgment motion in California state court, instead of the twenty-one
days allowed in federal court, which means that plaintiffs can conduct additional depositions
while the motion is pending in state court); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney G
(Dec. 8, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (explaining that federal court imposes
fewer fees than state court).
60. For research examining state and federal judicial selection and tenure and possible
impacts of those differences on decisionmaking, see generally, for example, Vicki C. Jackson,
Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J.
965 (2007) (explaining how the selection, tenure, and removal provisions for Article III judges
relate to judicial independence); Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: De-
mand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579 (2005) (describing judicial selection
processes and recommending reforms); and Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impar-
tial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623 (2009) (analyzing the effects of elections and campaigning on ju-
dicial decisionmaking among state supreme court judges). For concerns that state court judges
are less familiar with civil rights claims, see infra notes 161, 243 and accompanying text.
61. For an overview of these and other differences in state and federal jury pools, see
Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and the Concept of
Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 105–09 (2004) (“[T]he values of minority communities are
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ferent sources, including voting records, department of motor vehicle rec-
ords, and tax records.62 There can also be variation in attorneys’ participa-
tion in voir dire, the number of jurors seated in any given trial, and una-
unanimity requirements.63
C. Defendants
Other key elements of civil rights ecosystems relate to the government
entity that employed the government officials who engaged in the allegedly
unconstitutional behavior. Local governments and the lawyers representing
them take different approaches to the litigation of constitutional claims, in-
cluding their inclination to raise qualified immunity and other dispositive
motions, seek stays of litigation while motions are pending, challenge dis-
covery requests, and bring interlocutory appeals.64 Defendants and their
counsel also vary in the timing and attractiveness of the settlement offers
they make—some are willing to pay substantial sums to resolve a case before
it is ever filed; others will not make meaningful settlement offers until after
their summary judgment motion has been denied.65
more likely to be subsumed in juries drawn from larger federal districts than they would be in
smaller, county-based state court juries.”), and Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal
Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J. 2236, 2287 (2014) (“[T]he federal district always
comprises a larger geographic area than the local county. Depending on the district, it can
comprise anything from one city and its surrounding counties to an entire state.” (footnote
omitted)).
62. See Alexander E. Preller, Note, Jury Duty Is a Poll Tax: The Case for Severing the
Link Between Voter Registration and Jury Service, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 42–48
(2012) (describing jury pool rules across the country); see also, e.g., Telephone Interview with
Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney G (Dec. 19, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (explain-
ing that, in the Middle District of Florida, a state juror need only have a driver’s license, but a
federal juror must be registered to vote).
63. See, e.g., LEE SMALLEY EDMON & CURTIN E.A. KARNOW, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE
GUIDE: CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ch. 3-E, Westlaw (database updated June 2019) (de-
scribing differences in the size of California state and federal juries); Telephone Interview with
N. Dist. Cal. Attorney G, supra note 59 (explaining that in California state court, there are
twelve jurors and juries do not need to be unanimous, whereas federal juries have between six
and twelve jurors and must be unanimous); Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attor-
ney D (Nov. 20, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“You have way better opportu-
nities [in state court] as far as examining the jurors and finding out who they really are, what
their attitudes are. In federal court, you basically get name, rank, and serial number and some
of the judges won’t even let the attorneys ask questions at all.”).
64. For differences in defense attorneys’ litigation practices, see infra notes 176–177
(comparing defense counsel’s motion practice in Philadelphia and Houston). For variation in
discovery stay requests and interlocutory appeals, see Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection
Effects, supra note 23, at 1123–25.
65. See infra notes 178–179 and accompanying text. For the possible effects of variation
in defendants’ settlement practices, see Rachel A. Harmon, Evaluating and Improving Structur-
al Reform in Police Departments, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 617, 618–19 (2017) (pointing
to variation in defense counsel settlement decisions as a possible reason for variation in lawsuit
filings and outcomes).
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Differences in litigation and settlement strategy may be partly attributa-
ble to whether the jurisdiction has liability insurance.66 Some attorneys re-
port that municipal liability insurers’ attorneys litigate more aggressively
than attorneys for self-insured jurisdictions.67 Others report that insurers
view litigation and settlement decisions through a financial lens, which
means that they are more likely than self-insured jurisdictions to settle
quickly if it makes business sense to do so.68 Litigation and settlement deci-
sions can also vary depending on how counsel is paid. For example, some
plaintiffs’ attorneys report that private attorneys who contract with local
governments or insurers to defend officers may delay meaningful settlement
negotiations until they have billed the maximum authorized by their retainer
agreements.69 And litigation and settlement decisions can sometimes depend
on the skill and experience of the individual defense lawyer.70 It is impossible
to generalize about how insurance, attorney fee arrangements, and individu-
66. For a discussion of municipal liability insurance, see generally John Rappaport, How
Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (2017). See also Joanna C.
Schwartz, How Governments Pay, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1188–92 (2016) (comparing self-
insured jurisdictions with jurisdictions reliant on municipal liability insurance).
67. See Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney F (Apr. 25, 2017) (on file with
the Michigan Law Review) (explaining that, with insurance counsel, “there’s a little more room
for experts, there’s a little more room for [a] ‘we’re going to take everybody’s deposition’ type
mentality”); Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney E (Nov. 30, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (“[T]here’s a risk management fund in Florida that insures
Sheriff’s offices that have elected to be in the fund. And dealing with those people was like
banging your head against the wall.”).
68. See Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney B, supra note 54 (“[W]hen
there’s insurance defense counsel representing the officers, they are more rational and treat it
more like a business decision, and it’s less about kicking the can down the road.”); Telephone
Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney F (Dec. 13, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view) (explaining that insurance companies are “much more open to settlement and resolving
issues because it’s an insurance company looking at the dollars, not the government entity”);
Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A (May 4, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (“[Insurance attorneys] are more like PI [personal injury] lawyers. They will size up
cases earlier; [they are] more likely [than self-insured jurisdictions] . . . to resolve cases early
on.”).
69. See Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney D, supra note 63 (“[M]any
times the law enforcement agency is insured, and it seems like their insurance cut-off point is
always $50,000 for attorneys’ fees. So whoever it is who pulls the assignment runs me around
until they’ve gotten themselves paid $50,000, and then they’ll start talking about settlements.”).
See also, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney A, supra note 59 (“[M]any of
these private law firms defending these cases need to bill a lot of hours on these files in order to
get paid on them.”); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney C (Nov. 10, 2017) (on
file with the Michigan Law Review) (“[Private attorneys] want to do their 50 hours, get 50 more
hours of pay by doing their motion for summary judgment and then settling.”).
70. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney C (May 5, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (“[H]ow our cases progress with the city really depends on
which solicitor we get. Some are notoriously disorganized and that’s giving them the best of it,
and then we have to constantly file motions and compel discovery. Others get back to you right
away and are very professional. Some tend to value our cases, others tend to undervalue our
cases.”).
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al attorneys’ skill and experience influence litigation and settlement strate-
gy—but important to recognize that that they can and do.
Different jurisdictions also have distinct rules and policies regarding of-
ficer indemnification. Although I have previously found that officers virtual-
ly never contribute to the satisfaction of settlements and judgments entered
against them,71 there is significant variation among cities’ and counties’ in-
demnification policies and practices.72 Some jurisdictions indemnify their
employees for all conduct within the course and scope of their employment
as a matter of law, other jurisdictions assess indemnification on a case-by-
case basis but virtually always indemnify, and other jurisdictions have poli-
cies against indemnification but may still pay to settle some claims against
their officers in advance of trial.73 Some jurisdictions also cap the amount
they are willing to indemnify.74
Finally, jurisdictions vary in their ability to satisfy settlements and
judgments awarded against them and their officers. In recent years, several
cities and counties have been in and out of bankruptcy proceedings.75 Other
jurisdictions are not formally in bankruptcy but are uninsured or inade-
quately insured and do not have the funds to satisfy large settlements and
judgments.76
D. Counsel
Another key element of any civil rights ecosystem is the availability of
counsel to bring civil rights cases on behalf of plaintiffs. Of course, a plaintiff
can choose to file a case without counsel. But pro se plaintiffs are far less
likely to be successful than plaintiffs who secure legal representation.77 Suc-
71. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 890.
72. See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1805–07 (describing variation in indemnification
policies and practices, despite the practical reality that officers virtually never contribute to set-
tlements or judgments).
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., infra note 183 and accompanying text (describing Houston’s indemnifica-
tion caps).
75. See Brad Plumer, Detroit Isn’t Alone. The U.S. Cities that Have Gone Bankrupt, in
One Map, WASH. POST (July 18, 2013, 6:25 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/2013/07/18/detroit-isnt-alone-the-u-s-cities-that-have-gone-bankrupt-in-one-map/ (on
file with the Michigan Law Review).
76. See, e.g., Andrew Cockburn, Blood Money, HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2018, at 61 (de-
scribing the impact of lawsuit payouts on small uninsured and underinsured jurisdictions, as
well as on larger cities); see also Schwartz, supra note 66, at 1190–92 (describing jurisdictions
that have lost insurance coverage and police departments that have closed as a result of liability
exposure); infra notes 106–113 and accompanying text (describing financial troubles in East
Cleveland).
77. Prior studies have generally defined a plaintiff as “successful” if a case results in a
settlement, voluntary dismissal, plaintiff’s verdict, or split verdict. See Alexander A. Reinert,
Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability
Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 812 n.13 (2010) (describing the common definition of plaintiff
“success” in similar studies). I use this definition of “success” for the purposes of my research
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cess may also build on itself—studies have found that more experienced at-
torneys tend to be more successful.78 When I examined two years of civil
rights filings in five federal court districts across the country, I found that
attorneys who entered appearances in three or more cases during the two-
year period were, on average, more often successful than attorneys who en-
tered one or two appearances during that period.79
“SUCCESS” RATE OF ALL CASES, BY DISTRICT AND BY ATTORNEY
APPEARANCES
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and analysis. For studies finding represented plaintiffs succeed at a higher rate than pro se
plaintiffs in civil rights cases, see, for example, id. at 838; Russell Engler, Connecting Self-
Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal About When Counsel Is Most Need-
ed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37 (2010); and Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1555, 1610–11 (2003).
78. See, e.g., Susan Brodie Haire et al., Attorney Expertise, Litigant Success, and Judicial
Decisionmaking in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667 (1999); Catherine T.
Harris et al., Who Are Those Guys? An Empirical Examination of Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs’
Attorneys, 58 SMU L. REV. 225 (2005); Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys
Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Out-
comes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235 (2006).
79. For descriptions of the methodology underlying this research, see supra note 23.
Attorneys who entered one or two appearances over the two-year period of my study pre-
vailed—through a settlement, judgment, or voluntary dismissal—in 65% of the cases they
brought, whereas attorneys who entered three or more appearances over the two-year period
prevailed in 73.3% of the cases they brought. The only exception is the Middle District of Flor-
ida, where attorneys who entered one or two appearances were more successful than attorneys
who entered three or more appearances.
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It may be that represented plaintiffs are more successful because their
claims have more merit; plaintiffs’ attorneys, who usually take civil rights
cases on contingency, have strong incentives to select the cases most likely to
win and decline the cases least likely to be successful.80 And one might ex-
pect that the more experienced attorneys would have first pick among cases,
and so select the very strongest and most likely to succeed. But plaintiffs’ at-
torneys will tell you that civil rights litigation is an exceedingly complicated
area of practice.81 It would make sense, then, that lawyers with experience
bringing civil rights cases—and success in those cases—would be more likely
to succeed in the cases they bring.
The number of experienced plaintiffs’ attorneys in a region matters in
another way—because those attorneys can train and mentor less experienced
lawyers in this complex and shifting area of the law.82 For all of these rea-
sons, the number of plaintiffs’ lawyers willing to take civil rights cases—and
the expertise of those lawyers—likely play a significant role in the number of
suits filed and the ultimate success of those claims.
E. Interaction Effects
Thus far, I have described several elements of civil rights ecosystems: the
availability of federal and state causes of action; the characteristics of federal
and state judges and juries; defendants’ litigation practices, indemnification
practices, and financial health; and the depth and experience of the plaintiffs’
bar. As my descriptions have indicated, characteristics of any given element
can make a civil rights ecosystem more or less friendly to civil rights claims.
As I will show here, the interaction of various elements in an ecosystem can
also create distinct challenges and opportunities.
Imagine that a police officer signals for someone to pull over for a bro-
ken taillight; the person does not pull over for several blocks; when the per-
80. For further discussion of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ case-selection decisions, see Schwartz,
Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, supra note 23.
81. For discussion of plaintiffs’ attorneys’ views about the complexity of qualified im-
munity, see id. See also, e.g., Clifford S. Zimmerman, The Scholar Warrior: Visualizing the Ka-
leidoscope That Is Entity Liability, Negotiating the Terrain and Finding a New Paradigm, 48
DEPAUL. L. REV. 773, 773 (1999) (“The civil rights lawyer who pursues a claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against a public entity must epitomize the Scholar Warrior, deftly balancing an ever
splintering and multiplying framework of what constitutes public entity liability with the tact,
fervor, and energy found in only the greatest of strategists and fighters.”).
82. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney G, supra note 54 (ex-
plaining that if someone “start[s] wading in [to civil rights work] without really having a good
colleague to guide them . . . they’re going to have one case and that’s going to be it because they
will conclude that this work is too difficult”); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney
E, supra note 53 (“I think, like, in Chicago, some firms started having success, and I think that
bred more interest. And in some places, they just don’t have a tradition of people winning
these cases. And if there’s not a tradition of people winning the cases, then nobody’s going to
try to do it.”).
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son does pull over, the officer approaches, opens the car door, and throws
the person to the ground; the officer then shoots the person (who survives).
The person contends that the officer’s force was unprovoked and unjustified.
The officer contends that he saw the person reaching for a gun just before
the officer opened the car door. Whether a suit is filed and whether it is ul-
timately successful will depend in no small part on the facts of the case—the
extent of the person’s injuries; the reliability of the officer’s testimony;
whether there is a video of the interaction;83 the likeability of the parties;84
and perhaps the sex, race, citizenship status, education, criminal history, and
mental capacity of the person shot. Whether a suit is filed, whether a finding
of wrongdoing is reached, and any amount awarded to the person also de-
pends on where the violence occurred.
In part this is because of variation in federal circuit court precedent. Cir-
cuit courts differ in many ways about the scope of the Fourth Amendment.85
For example, there is a circuit split about the relevance of preseizure conduct
in excessive force cases. Some circuits—the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh—
do not consider an officer’s conduct in the time leading up to the use of
force, focusing only on the reasonableness of the force at the moment it was
used.86 Some circuits—the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh—apply a “seg-
mented approach,” in which courts divide an interaction into multiple
events and separately analyze the reasonableness of an officer’s behavior in
each segment.87 And some circuits—the First, Third, and Tenth—consider
an officer’s behavior leading up to the use of force when determining wheth-
er the officer acted reasonably.88 Accordingly, if this shooting occurred in
Orlando, Florida (in the Eleventh Circuit), and the person brought a § 1983
claim against the officer, a district court would only consider the reasonable-
ness of the officer’s conduct at the moment of the shooting (when, the officer
asserts, he believes he saw a gun). If this shooting happened in Houston,
Texas (in the Fifth Circuit) or Cleveland, Ohio (in the Sixth Circuit), district
courts would consider the reasonableness of the officer’s behavior at multi-
ple stages of the interaction. And if this shooting happened in Philadelphia
(in the Third Circuit), the district court would consider the reasonableness
of the shooting in the broader context of the interaction, including the of-
ficer’s decisions to pursue the person for a broken taillight, pull him over,
and throw him to the ground.
83. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, supra note 23, at 1133 & n.131.
84. Id. at 1134 & n.133.
85. See Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L. J. 369 (2018).
86. See, e.g., McClellan, supra note 44, at 9–10.
87. Id. at 10–16.
88. See id. at 16–23. Although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in County of Los An-
geles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017), held that an officer’s use of force was not unreasonable
simply because “the officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent response,” McClellan,
supra note 44, at 25 (quoting Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1545), it did not resolve “whether a totality
of the circumstances analysis can take into account police conduct prior to the use of force that
cause the need to use the excessive force at issue,” id.
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One could reasonably conclude, given this circuit split, that the case
against the Orlando officer would be least likely to succeed, the case against
the Philadelphia officer would be most likely to succeed, and the chances of
winning cases against the Houston and Cleveland officers would be equal,
and somewhere between the chances of plaintiffs in Orlando and Philadelph-
ia. But it would be a mistake to consider only the circuit courts’ analyses of
preseizure conduct when assessing whether the person shot by the police
would file a claim or recover, or the amount of any recovery.
Imagine that the shooting occurred in Cleveland. Because the Sixth Cir-
cuit—where Ohio is located—applies a segmented approach,89 the plaintiff
would need to show that the officer’s behavior was unreasonable at one or
more moments in the interaction to prevail on a § 1983 claim. But, in Ohio,
this is not the plaintiff’s only path to relief—in the alternative, or in addition,
the plaintiff could bring a state law claim for assault and battery against the
individual officer.90 Under Ohio state law, the plaintiff would have to show
that the officer’s actions were reckless, wanton, or malicious.91 But, when
making this analysis, there is no segmenting—a court could consider the rea-
sonableness of the officer’s conduct during the entire interaction—and quali-
fied immunity is unavailable to the officer.92 So, the plaintiff’s § 1983 exces-
excessive force claim brought against the Cleveland officer may be dismissed
if the court concludes the force was reasonable under the Sixth Circuit’s
segmenting approach or finds the officer is entitled to qualified immunity,
but he may prevail on a state claim based on the same shooting.93
The viability of the state claim against the officer implicates other as-
pects of state law and practice as well. Imagine the plaintiff brings federal
and state causes of action against the Cleveland officer in federal court, but
the federal claims are dismissed and the state claims are remanded to state
court. Although the plaintiff can proceed on the state law claims, attorneys’
fees—available to a plaintiff who prevails on a cause of action under
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also Claybrook v. Birchwell, 274 F.3d
1098, 1103–05 (6th Cir. 2001).
90. The City of Cleveland would not, however, be held vicariously liable for the torts of
its officers. See Hunt v. City of Toledo Law Dep’t, 881 F. Supp. 2d 854, 883 (N.D. Ohio 2012)
(describing Ohio law immunizing municipalities from civil liability for most torts committed
by their employees).
91. See, e.g., Irvin v. City of Shaker Heights, 809 F. Supp. 2d 719, 738 (N.D. Ohio 2011)
(describing the standard of proof for state tort actions for assault and battery).
92. See Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney G, supra note 54 (describing
these differences in state and federal law).
93. There is a different, but equally contingent and regionally variable, relationship be-
tween federal constitutional rights and state law in the criminal context. See Wayne A. Logan,
Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local Criminal Laws and the Applicability of Federal
Constitutional Rights, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 146 (2009) (“[P]olice authority to search
and seize individuals, regulated by the Fourth Amendment, hinges on state and local decisions
to criminalize particular behaviors . . . differ[ing] within states themselves, as a result of the
significant criminal lawmaking authority of local governments.”).
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§ 1983—will not be available.94 The consequences of pursuing a state law
claim will also be shaped by other characteristics of the state court system.
One civil rights attorney I interviewed who practices in Cleveland believes
state judges are less friendly to civil rights cases because their appointment
process is more political but prefers state court because the juries are smaller
and do not have to be unanimous and because attorneys play a more active
role in voir dire.95 Other civil rights attorneys practicing in Cleveland have
different views about the relative desirability of state and federal fora.96 Re-
gardless of whether an attorney prefers state or federal court, their views on
the topic are based on the interaction of multiple factors, including limita-
tions of federal law, the availability of state law claims, and the characteristics
of Ohio state and federal courts.
There’s more. The viability of the claim also depends on whether the
plaintiff will be able to recover any settlement or judgment he is awarded.
Cleveland has historically indemnified its officers, but in recent years it de-
nied indemnification to officers in two high-profile cases after juries entered
multimillion-dollar verdicts.97 In both cases, Cleveland hired attorneys for
the officers to help them enter bankruptcy.98 Plaintiffs’ attorneys in both cas-
es are challenging Cleveland’s decision to deny indemnification and the unu-
sual step of hiring bankruptcy attorneys for these officers.99 Depending upon
the outcome of those legal challenges, plaintiffs’ attorneys deciding whether
to file a case may seriously consider the possibility that Cleveland will refuse
94. See Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney G, supra note 54 (reporting
that attorneys’ fees are not available for Ohio state law claims).
95. See Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney A (May 1, 2017) (on file with
the Michigan Law Review).
96. Compare Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney F (Dec. 8, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (explaining he may bring solely state law claims in state court
“depending on what the client is looking at and what they want to achieve, and whether we can
get in there quickly and get some resolution and want to get a quick trial”), with Telephone
Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney G, supra note 54 (explaining that he files federal claims
in federal court because “the exposure on attorneys’ fees is too important”).
97. See Radley Balko, Opinion, Cleveland’s Vile, Embarrassing Scheme to Avoid Paying
Victims of Police Abuse, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016, 11:45 AM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/the-watch/wp/2016/01/20/clevelands-vile-embarrassing-scheme-to-avoid-paying-
victims-of-police-abuse/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Kyle Swenson, How Cleve-
land’s Trying to Get Out of Paying $18.7 Million in Judgments Against Two Cleveland Police
Officers, CLEV. SCENE (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.clevescene.com/cleveland/how-clevelands-
trying-to-get-out-of-paying-187-million-in-judgments-against-two-cleveland-police-
officers/Content?oid=4692049 [https://perma.cc/E7F6-2CNT].
98. See Balko, supra note 97; Swenson, supra note 97.
99. See Balko, supra note 97; Marianna Brown Bettman, What’s on Their Minds: Can a
Judgment Creditor of a City Employee Directly Enforce Indemnification Against the City Under
R.C. 2744.07(A)(2)? David Ayers v. City of Cleveland, LEGALLY SPEAKING OHIO (June 28,
2019), https://www.legallyspeakingohio.com/2019/06/whats-on-their-minds-can-a-judgment-
creditor-of-a-city-employee-directly-enforce-indemnification-against-the-city-under-r-c-
2744-07a2-david-ayers-v-city-of-cleveland/ [https://perma.cc/K3KY-Q5QN] (describing the
oral argument in one of the cases, Ayers v. City of Cleveland).
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to indemnify individual officers following a large jury verdict. In order to
safeguard against that possibility, the plaintiff may decide to bring a Monell
claim directly against the City of Cleveland.
The ability to successfully maneuver through the challenges of § 1983
claims against the officer and municipality and state assault and battery
claims against the officer depends upon a final element of the ecosystem—
experienced plaintiffs’ counsel. One attorney I interviewed who practices in
Cleveland reports that he often brings both a § 1983 excessive force claim
and state law assault and battery claims if he is worried about the segmenting
analysis and qualified immunity.100 But less seasoned attorneys, or a plaintiff
proceeding pro se, would not necessarily know to plead in the alternative or
to argue the differences between the requirements of § 1983 and state law. A
pro se plaintiff or inexperienced attorney would also have less insight about
the tradeoffs associated with state and federal court and might not know to
bring a municipal liability claim to protect against the possibility that Cleve-
land would refuse to indemnify.
The civil rights ecosystem in Cleveland, Ohio is made up of all of these
elements—the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of various federal doctrines (in-
cluding the scope of the Fourth Amendment, qualified immunity, and mu-
nicipal liability), the availability of state law tort claims, the characteristics of
state and federal juries, the threat that the city will not indemnify, and the
number of experienced attorneys able to guide plaintiffs through these vari-
ous challenges. As I have shown, these elements are inescapably connected:
The limits of federal law may lead attorneys to rely on state law claims, and
the reliance on state law claims may invoke the jurisdiction of state court
judges and juries. The possibility that the city will refuse to indemnify its of-
ficers may cause the plaintiff to file a Monell claim against the municipality.
And the successful navigation of these many twists and turns depends on
seasoned plaintiffs’ counsel. As I will show in the next Part, the collection of
elements in some civil rights ecosystems are far more hospitable to civil
rights claims than in others.
II. ECOSYSTEM VARIATION: CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN PHILADELPHIA
AND HOUSTON
There are a wide variety of natural ecosystems around the world. Some
ecosystems are particularly welcoming to plant and animal growth. In tropi-
cal rainforests, heavy rainfall, strong sun, and humidity cause plants to grow
quickly; the plants attract diverse insects, birds, and animals; bacteria and
fungi in the soil quickly break down dead matter and return nutrients to the
soil.101 Rainforests cover less than 7% of the planet but are home to between
100. See Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney G, supra note 54.
101. See Rainforest, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclo
pedia/rain-forest/ [https://perma.cc/6HEC-PQB4].
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half and two-thirds of the earth’s plant and animal species.102 Deserts, in
contrast, receive less than ten inches of rain each year and are difficult places
for most animals and plants to live.103
There is similar variation in civil rights ecosystems. As I have shown,
civil rights ecosystems are made up of various elements—federal law; state
law; federal and state judges and juries; plaintiffs’ attorneys; and defendants
with different litigation practices, indemnification rules, and financial stabil-
ity. These elements combine to create vastly different environments for civil
rights litigation. In some ecosystems, plaintiffs’ attorneys view state and fed-
eral causes of action, judges, juries, and government litigation and settlement
practices to be fair or favorable to their clients and decide which combina-
tion of claims and court makes the most sense given the particular facts of
any given case. Other ecosystems are less hospitable: federal rights have been
construed narrowly, state claims are unavailable or are an unattractive op-
tion, courts and juries are unsympathetic to plaintiffs suing government offi-
cials, and indemnification is not a certainty.
Sometimes, a single distinction between two ecosystems can make a sig-
nificant difference. Take, for example, Cleveland and East Cleveland. Alt-
hough Cleveland is much larger than East Cleveland, the jurisdictions are in
many ways the same. Cleveland and East Cleveland border one another. The
federal judges and juries who hear the cases are the same. The state and fed-
eral laws are the same. The same civil rights attorneys can bring cases in both
jurisdictions.104 And both cities’ police departments have been plagued by
corruption and excessive force.105
The key difference concerns the financial health of the two cities. Alt-
hough Cleveland declined to indemnify officers in two recent cases,106 and is
102. Richard O. Bierregaard Jr. et al., The Biological Dynamics of Tropical Rainforest
Fragments, 42 BIOSCIENCE 859, 859 (1992).
103. See, e.g., Neil F. Hadley & Stan R. Szarek, Productivity of Desert Ecosystems, 31
BIOSCIENCE 747, 747 (1981).
104. In my two-year, five-district study, I found that twenty attorneys entered three or
more appearances in the Northern District of Ohio on behalf of plaintiffs in police misconduct
cases, and a dozen of those attorneys sued the Cleveland Police Department and its officers
during that period. See Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 23, for further de-
scription of this study.
105. See Mayra Cuevas & Catherine E. Shoichet, East Cleveland, Ohio, Mayor: 2 Officers
Fired, Could Face Charges, CNN (July 29, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/07/29/us/east-
cleveland-police-officers-fired/index.html [https://perma.cc/HST9-PNCG]. For the Depart-
ment of Justice’s investigation of the Cleveland Police Department, see Letter from Vanita
Gupta, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., and Steven M.
Dettelbach, U.S. Attorney, N. Dist. of Ohio, to Frank G. Jackson, Mayor, City of Cleveland
(Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2014
/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/A99G-SPJW]. For
reports of excessive force and corruption in East Cleveland see, for example, Jon Schuppe,
Rogue East Cleveland Cops Framed Dozens of Drug Suspects, NBC NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017, 4:08
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/rogue-east-cleveland-cops-framed-dozens-
drug-suspects-n736671 [https://perma.cc/HTR3-SKT4].
106. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text.
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struggling financially,107 the city has been able to satisfy its legal liabilities.108
The City of East Cleveland, in contrast, does not have the resources to pay
settlements and judgments entered against it and its officers. East Cleveland
is self-insured, so lawsuit payments come from its general funds.109 And the
city is reportedly on the verge of bankruptcy.110 As a result, attorneys who
regularly bring civil rights cases against Cleveland are unwilling to sue the
East Cleveland Police Department and its officers.111 An attorney I inter-
viewed described East Cleveland as “an absolute swamp” where “crime is be-
ing committed against citizens” without recourse.112 But because the city “is
on the verge of bankruptcy . . . the financial reality is . . . most firms can’t af-
ford to . . . risk not getting paid.”113
East Cleveland’s financial crisis creates a dramatic distinction between
Cleveland’s and East Cleveland’s ecosystems, despite the many other ways in
which they are the same. The variations between other civil rights ecosys-
tems are the product of more complex interacting factors, even if the results
are similarly dramatic. In the remainder of this Part, I describe the civil
rights ecosystems in two cities—Philadelphia and Houston—as one example
of this more complex type of differentiation.114
107. See Cleveland Finances Earn ‘C’ Grade, TRUTH ACCT. (Jan. 2019),
https://www.truthinaccounting.org/library/doclib/CLE-2017-2pager.pdf [https://perma.cc
/9QY4-T9H9].
108. See Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney A, supra note 95.
109. See id. (“East Cleveland is self-insured . . . so therefore whatever assets they have in
their operating funds, so to speak, or in their rainy day fund would come [in]to play to satisfy a
judgment.”).
110. Alexia Fernández Campbell, A Suburb on the Brink of Bankruptcy, ATLANTIC (June
8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/a-suburb-on-the-brink-of-
bankruptcy/486188/ [https://perma.cc/EN6S-UVF9]; Aaron Renn, How to Save a Dying Sub-
urb, CITYLAB (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/09/suburbs-should-
merge/540258/ [https://perma.cc/6GFU-HC6Y].
111. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney A, supra note 95
(“[L]awyers like myself don’t have an incentive to . . . spend [$100,000 to] $200,000 to develop
the case . . . No lawyers want to take those cases where they risk losing $200 grand over that
much time and not get the money out. That’s what you find in East Cleveland . . . .”); Tele-
phone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney D (Nov. 20, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law
Review) (“[M]ost lawyers are deterred [from filing cases against East Cleveland] by the fact that
they figure they’re not going to be paid. I think it’s an economic decision.”); Telephone Inter-
view with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney F, supra note 96 (explaining that he has turned down cases
against East Cleveland because it has no resources). When journalists making the Serial pod-
cast interviewed eleven attorneys who practice in the Northern District of Ohio, ten of the
eleven said that they would not file a case against East Cleveland: “[N]o way, they said. It’s not
worth it, said one. I have a business to run, said another. We heard, there’s no reward. We
heard, it’s a bitch. We heard, I turn down any case that comes from East Cleveland, and it’s
heartbreaking.” You in the Red Shirt, SERIAL 36:05–36:18 (Oct. 18, 2018) (on file with the Mich-
igan Law Review).
112. Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney A, supra note 95.
113. Id.
114. I have focused here on cities, but federal districts, states, and even federal circuits
could also be understood as their own civil rights ecosystems. Some aspects of civil rights eco-
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Although the police departments in Philadelphia and Houston are of
similar size, ten times more lawsuits were filed against Philadelphia and its
officers than were filed against Houston and its officers during a recent two-
year period, and Philadelphia plaintiffs recovered one hundred times more
than Houston plaintiffs in these cases.115 As I have explained, available evi-
dence suggests that the dramatic difference in cases filed and dollars paid
cannot be explained by officer behavior.116 Instead, at least some of the varia-
tion in claims and payouts is attributable to the civil rights ecosystems in
each city. This Article does not attempt to comprehensively describe all fac-
ets of each city that contribute to their distinctive ecosystems—some areas
that beg further inquiry include internal police policies, trainings, supervi-
sion, and oversight; union agreements; government record keeping and
transparency; criminal prosecution practices and use of release-dismissal
agreements; and each community’s history of racial and class inequity and
political mobilization.117 For now, I stick closer to the courthouse and ex-
plore how differences in state and federal law, judges, juries, litigation and
settlement decisions, and the plaintiffs’ bar make Philadelphia more condu-
cive to bringing civil rights claims and allow Philadelphia plaintiffs to prevail
more often and recover more when they do.
Let’s return to the scenario described before—a police officer puts on his
lights, pulls over a person for a traffic violation, opens his door, pulls him
out of the car, and shoots him. What result if this happened in Philadelphia?
What result if this happened in Houston?
A. Causes of Action
Philadelphia. There are several causes of action that could be brought
against the Philadelphia police officer and the City of Philadelphia. One op-
tion would be to file a § 1983 case against the individual officer for violating
the Fourth Amendment. Because Philadelphia is in the Third Circuit, the
court would consider the reasonableness of the shooting in the context of the
entire interaction, including the officer’s decision to pull him over, open his
door, and pull him from the car.118
Although qualified immunity is generally considered a significant barri-
er to relief, there is little reason to fear this case would be dismissed on quali-
systems are highly localized: a city attorney’s office’s litigation practices and a city’s indemnifi-
cation policies, for example. Other aspects of civil rights ecosystems extend beyond jurisdic-
tional boundaries: the size and sophistication of the plaintiffs’ bar or jury pools, for example.
Some aspects of civil rights ecosystems are consistent state-wide: the availability of state law
claims, state law tort caps, and state jury rules. And although judges’ interpretations of federal
doctrines like qualified immunity and the scope of federal rights may vary, circuit court rulings
are binding on the district judges within the circuit.
115. See infra Section II.E (describing filing rates and payouts in both cities).
116. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 25–37 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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fied immunity grounds. When I studied two years of federal civil rights fil-
ings against the Philadelphia Police Department and its officers, I found 240
cases in which defendants could have raised qualified immunity.119 Yet de-
fendants did so in just twenty-nine cases—four cases at the motion to dis-
miss stage and twenty-five cases at summary judgment. Only two of these
qualified immunity motions were granted, and neither involved an excessive
force claim. Only one resulted in the dismissal of the case—the other case
settled before trial.
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that lawyers practicing in Phil-
adelphia view qualified immunity motions as more of an “annoyance” than
an actual threat.120 Attorneys reported that false arrest cases are vulnerable to
dismissal on qualified immunity grounds so long as an officer had “arguable
probable cause” to effect an arrest.121 But several attorneys reported that
there is essentially no qualified immunity for excessive force claims in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.122 When I followed up with one attorney,
noting that the Supreme Court had reversed denials of qualified immunity in
several excessive force cases in recent years, he stated: “I have never heard of
a motion for qualified immunity in just excessive force here. Not just my
cases but any cases.”123 Another attorney reported that defendants do raise
qualified immunity, but “it doesn’t work [in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania] for the most part.”124 A third attorney reported: “I haven’t lost on
qualified immunity for about fifteen or twenty years. And that case came
back and went to trial on the Monell claim and we won it.”125 Lawyers prac-
ticing in Philadelphia shared the view that qualified immunity motions in
excessive force cases were almost certain to fail at the motion to dismiss
119. See Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 23, and supra note 23 and
accompanying text for a description of this study.
120. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68.
121. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney D (Apr. 24, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (“[T]he cases that I primarily decline are those dealing with
just strictly false arrests. If I decline them at all—and I would say there is a small percentage of
those that I decline, but the ones that I do decline, the false arrests if I think they going to ulti-
mately get qualified immunity, then that claim is very difficult to prove.”); Telephone Inter-
view with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney G (May 15, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review)
(explaining that judges will grant qualified immunity if there is “arguable probable cause or
arguable reasonable suspicion”).
122. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (“[I]t’s re-
ally tough . . . to lose a case, an excessive force case, on qualified immunity grounds.”); Tele-
phone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney D, supra note 121 (stating that “there is no qualified
[immunity]” for excessive force cases).
123. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney D, supra note 121.
124. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney E, supra note 54.
125. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68.
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stage126 and could be defeated at summary judgment if the plaintiff could
create a factual dispute about the reasonableness of force used.127
A municipal liability claim may also be a viable option in Philadelphia.
Although Monell claims are considered hard to prove,128 one Philadelphia
attorney I interviewed was headed to trial on a Monell claim in a police
shooting case and had tried and won a Monell claim in another case.129 Nev-
ertheless, several lawyers reported that they did not need to bring Monell
claims in damages cases because Philadelphia police officers are virtually cer-
tain to be indemnified.130 Defense counsel in Philadelphia threaten not to
indemnify officers as part of settlement negotiations but rarely decline to in-
demnify officers.131 Accordingly, one lawyer explained, there is little need to
bring a Monell claim to ensure a deep pocket—a municipal liability claim
only makes sense if one is seeking systemic relief.132 A Monell claim is also
unlikely to be necessary to protect against dismissal on qualified immunity
grounds, given the infrequency with which the defense is successfully raised.
In addition, or in the alternative, a plaintiff could bring state law claims
against the officer.133 Plaintiffs can sue Philadelphia police officers under
126. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney G, supra note 121 (explain-
ing that lawyers in Philadelphia’s Law Department “answer much more often than they move
to dismiss on qualified immunity”).
127. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (“[Judges
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania] recognize that [qualified immunity] simply doesn’t lie
in most cases where there’s a clearly established constitutional right and there are factual dis-
putes as to whether that right was violated. And, you know, that’s our formula for defeating
qualified immunity in these cases.”); Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney F, supra
note 67 (explaining that qualified immunity is not granted at summary judgment in excessive
force cases because “the jury gets to decide whether the police officer is acting reasonably”).
128. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney B (Apr. 25, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (describing Monell as “a very difficult wall to climb”).
129. See Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68.
130. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney B, supra note 128; Tele-
phone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney D, supra note 121. For an analysis of indemnifica-
tion decisions by the City of Philadelphia, see Teressa E. Ravenell & Armando Brigandi, The
Blurred Blue Line: Municipal Liability, Police Indemnification, and Financial Accountability in
Section 1983 Litigation, 62 VILL. L. REV. 839 (2017).
131. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (reporting
that attorneys representing Philadelphia officers threaten not to indemnify officers “all the
time,” though they have actually refused to indemnify “very, very rarely and only in situations
where officers have been criminally charged and removed from the force”); Telephone Inter-
view with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney F, supra note 67 (describing a case in which the City of Phila-
delphia threatened not to indemnify officers but “they end[ed] up paying out a settlement on
their behalf”).
132. See Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney B, supra note 128 (“[Because of
indemnification,] Monell issues . . . really in Philadelphia are not terribly important to an indi-
vidual case. They might be important if you’re trying to get some injunctive relief, if you’re ar-
guing systemic conduct. But those are really rare cases.”).
133. Although the plaintiff could bring state tort claims against the officer, he could not
bring state tort claims directly against the City of Philadelphia. See Panas v. City of Philadelph-
ia, 871 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375–76 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (explaining that government entities have im-
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state law for assault and battery, among other state law claims.134 There is no
qualified immunity135 and no damages cap limiting recovery for willful mis-
conduct (although there is also no entitlement to attorneys’ fees).136 To re-
cover damages on state law claims, the jury must find that the officer
engaged in criminal conduct, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful miscon-
duct.137 If the jury makes one of these findings, the city does not have to in-
demnify the officer as a matter of law,138 but “as a matter of routine, they do”
indemnify in these cases.139
Houston. If this case arose in Houston, the plaintiff would have fewer
possible legal claims than would the plaintiff in Philadelphia and greater
challenges when pursuing those claims. While the Third Circuit, where Phil-
adelphia is located, considers the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct giv-
en the totality of the circumstances, the Fifth Circuit, where Houston is
located, applies the segmenting approach to assess preseizure conduct.140 So,
if the plaintiff filed a § 1983 claim against the Houston police officer, the dis-
trict judge would consider the reasonableness of the shooting within a nar-
rower temporal context; the officer’s decision to pursue the person for a
traffic violation or pull him out of the car are unlikely to figure into the
Fourth Amendment assessment regarding the shooting.
Qualified immunity would also pose a more serious risk to a § 1983
claim brought against a Houston officer.141 Whereas Philadelphia officers
munity under the Tort Claims Act for intentional torts by their employees, with enumerated
exceptions that would not apply in this case).
134. See Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney C, supra note 70 (describing var-
ious state torts that can be brought against Philadelphia police officers, including assault and
battery, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution).
135. See id.
136. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (West 2017) (exempting cases of
agency or employee willful misconduct from statutory damages caps); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2503 (West 2004) (providing no entitlement to fee shifting for state tort claims).
137. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8550 (West 2017).
138. See id.
139. Id.; see also Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (ex-
plaining that, as a matter of Pennsylvania law, indemnification is not required if the plaintiff
proves “ ‘willful’ misconduct,” but “as a practical matter . . . they end up paying anyway”). But
see Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney D, supra note 121 (describing one case in
which Philadelphia did not indemnify after a jury found the officer’s conduct was willful and
that attorney’s decision not to bring state law claims in future cases).
140. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
141. This difference may be attributable in part to circuit variation regarding who bears
the burden of proof on qualified immunity. In the Third Circuit, the defendant bears the bur-
den of pleading and proving they are entitled to qualified immunity. See Alexander A. Reinert,
Qualified Immunity at Trial, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2071 (2018). In the Fifth Circuit,
the defendant bears only the burden of showing he was acting within his authority or acting in
good faith, and then the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the defendant is not entitled to
qualified immunity. See id. at 2072. The difference may also be attributable to variation in the
judicial composition of the Third and Fifth Circuits, see Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J.
Walker, Strategic Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55, 109–10 (2016) (demonstrating that the political
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raised qualified immunity in 12.1% of the cases in which they could raise the
defense during my two-year study period, Houston officers raised qualified
immunity in 61.9% of the cases in which they could raise the defense.142
Houston officers far more often raised qualified immunity at the motion to
dismiss stage—they did so in 19.1% of cases in which they could raise the de-
fense in my study, whereas Philadelphia officers brought motions to dismiss
on qualified immunity grounds in just 1.7% of cases. And qualified immuni-
ty motions are granted far more often in favor of Houston police officers
than Philadelphia police officers. Whereas district courts in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania dismissed less than 1% of cases filed against Philadelph-
ia officers on qualified immunity grounds, district courts in the Southern
District of Texas dismissed 22.7% of cases filed against Houston officers on
qualified immunity grounds.
Motions to dismiss on qualified immunity raise additional problems
when they are brought in the Southern District of Texas (where Houston is
located). In the Fifth Circuit, a plaintiff “has the burden to negate the asser-
tion of qualified immunity” once it is raised as a defense, and is expected to
“allege facts showing that the defendants committed a constitutional viola-
tion under the current law.”143 Pleading facts showing a constitutional viola-
tion can be particularly challenging because the Texas public records act
makes it difficult to gather information about law enforcement absent formal
discovery.144 These challenges are compounded by the fact that defendants
moving to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds sometimes ask the court
to stay discovery.145 One attorney explained how these protections interact:
[S]omeone dies in custody or gets injured or has excessive force used
against them, and you ask for the records, and they just say “no.” And then
they get the AG’s office to sign off on that. So, you have to file suit in feder-
al court here without sufficient information because they won’t give it to
you. Well, then the first thing they do is file a motion to dismiss and since
the court will not allow discovery in a qualified—in a case where they assert
qualified immunity prior to ruling on a motion to dismiss, you’re just ham-
affiliation of the president who appointed the circuit court judges on a panel impacts rulings
on qualified immunity), or to Third and Fifth Circuit judges’ relative sympathies towards civil
rights plaintiffs, see infra Section II.B.
142. Houston police could raise qualified immunity in twenty-one cases and did so in
thirteen of those cases. For further discussion of the study and methodology, see supra note 23
and accompanying text.
143. Rollerson v. City of Freeport, No. H–12–1790, 2013 WL 2189892, at *5 (S.D. Tex.
May 16, 2013).
144. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.108 (West 1988) (describing protections against dis-
closure of information about law enforcement if doing so could interfere with a city’s ability to
investigate or prosecute a crime). Philadelphia attorneys have reported that there is no similar
limitation on public records requests in Pennsylvania. See Email from E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A
to author (June 18, 2019, 1:45 PM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
145. See Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, supra note 23, at 1124–25.
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strung because you can’t get the discovery before suit and you can’t get the
discovery once the suit is filed because of qualified immunity.146
This attorney described one case—involving a death in custody—in which
she was able to overcome these barriers only because the FBI did its own in-
vestigation.147 The defendant in that case refused to produce information in
response to a public records request, then moved to dismiss on qualified
immunity, in part because the complaint included insufficient detail about
the allegations. While the motion was pending, the lawyer was able to get in-
formation about the investigation pursuant to a FOIA request to the FBI and
incorporate that information into the complaint.148 The lawyer reports that
the FBI investigation information helped her defeat defendant’s motion to
dismiss, but that victory was a modest one: “[J]ust being allowed to do dis-
covery has been a two-year battle.”149
Qualified immunity is even more frequently granted at summary judg-
ment. Houston police defendants filed summary judgment motions raising
qualified immunity in ten cases; two were granted in part, four were granted
in full, and all four of those cases were dismissed. While lawyers suing Phila-
delphia police officers report that they can defeat qualified immunity mo-
tions at summary judgment if they can gather sufficient evidence to create a
factual dispute,150 attorneys litigating against Houston and in the Southern
District of Texas report that courts often grant qualified immunity motions
at summary judgment after improperly construing evidence against the
plaintiffs.151 Two cases that recently reached the Supreme Court—Tolan v.
Cotton and Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston—demonstrate this approach to
summary judgment motions by judges in the Southern District of Texas.152
In both—cases in which police officers shot plaintiffs under hotly disputed
circumstances—the district court and Fifth Circuit judges discounted or ig-
nored evidence offered by plaintiffs.153





150. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney F (Nov. 15, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (describing an excessive force case dismissed at summary
judgment).
152. See Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277 (2017), denying cert. to 826
F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2016); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (2014) (per curiam).
153. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decisions in Tolan because material
factual disputes were ignored. See 134 S. Ct. at 1868 (describing the lower courts’ decisions as
“reflect[ing] a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards”). The Court declined
to grant certiorari in Salazar-Limon, against a spirited dissent by Justice Sotomayor (joined by
Justice Ginsberg), who observed that the Southern District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit
granted summary judgment “only by disregarding basic principles of summary judgment.” 137
S. Ct. at 1281 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). For descriptions of other summary judgment deci-
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Federal cases filed against Houston and its officers are also more vulner-
able to dismissal on grounds other than qualified immunity. Of the 268 fed-
eral cases filed against the Philadelphia Police Department and its officers
during my two-year study, 9% (25) were dismissed at the pleadings stage or
summary judgment on grounds other than qualified immunity. In contrast,
of the 25 federal cases filed against the Houston Police Department and its
officers during the same two-year period, 20% (5) were dismissed before trial
on grounds other than qualified immunity.
Lawyers believe that Monell claims are not a viable option in the South-
ern District of Texas because they are almost always unsuccessful.154 As in
Philadelphia, lawyers report that the City of Houston sometimes threatens
not to indemnify its officers for judgments yet generally pays settlements on
their behalf.155 Yet Houston will only indemnify up to $100,000 per officer or
$300,000 per occurrence.156 So if a claim is worth more than Houston will
indemnify, or Houston refuses to indemnify altogether, plaintiffs must rely
on municipal liability claims if they hope to recover.
In Philadelphia, plaintiffs can choose to bring state law claims against
individual officers. But the Texas attorneys I interviewed agreed that there
are no viable state law claims to bring against Houston or its officers in ex-
cessive force cases.157 The Texas Tort Claims Act waives government im-
munity for state law claims in limited circumstances, but there is no waiver
for assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional torts.158
There is also no cause of action for a violation of the Texas Constitution.159
sions in which the Fifth Circuit appears to have ignored its obligation to view facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: Time to
Change the Message, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1887, 1918–22 (2018).
154. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney A, supra note 54 (“[A]s of
late it’s almost impossible to allege Monell liability if you haven’t sued an entity multiple times.
I mean it’s just impossible.”); Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney B, supra note
146 (“Even if you can show a pattern, the court here in the Fifth Circuit . . . always distin-
guishes it somehow.”).
155. See Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney B, supra note 146; Telephone
Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney F, supra note 151 (explaining that Houston’s attorneys
say that the city will not indemnify judgments against Houston police officers but that it does
satisfy settlements). For one exception, see infra note 199.
156. See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
157. See Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney A, supra note 54 (“You don’t
really have much to go after as far as the Texas Tort Claims Act, or any kind of independent
torts . . . . 1983 is typically your only avenue.”); Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney
F, supra note 151 (explaining that Texas police officers cannot be sued under state law for in-
tentional torts).
158. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.057 (West 2019).
159. See City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. 1995).
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B. Decisionmakers
Philadelphia. If this case arose in Philadelphia, the plaintiff could file
federal and state claims in federal court or file only state claims and remain
in state court. Most attorneys view federal judges as preferable to state judg-
es. The attorneys I interviewed repeatedly praised federal judges in the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit for their fairness.160 State
court judges are considered to be less familiar with § 1983 cases than federal
judges161—although one attorney observed that, as plaintiffs are filing more
cases in state court, state judges’ familiarity with these types of cases is in-
creasing.162 On the other hand, the attorneys I interviewed consider state
court juries in Philadelphia to be preferable to their federal counterparts.
Federal juries in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania are more conservative
than Philadelphia state juries because federal juries are drawn from both
Philadelphia and the surrounding counties.163
160. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (describing
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit as “a terrific bench”); Telephone
Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney B, supra note 128 (explaining that “you’re going to get a
fair trial [in] a federal court”); Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney D, supra note
121 (“[W]e have had some judges that are from the solicitor’s office that come to the defense
side of it and [are] pretty staunch Republicans. So normally you would think that they are very
supportive of law enforcement or they are ready to lean that way, but I find that the judges in
Philadelphia are very good. There are some that are probably more liberal than others but I
think on par, they give you fair shakes . . . .”); Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney E,
supra note 54 (attributing the judicial character of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to the
fact that former Senator Arlen Specter, then a Republican from Pennsylvania, worked with
Democrats to nominate moderate judges for the Third Circuit); Telephone Interview with E.
Dist. Pa. Attorney F, supra note 67 (“[F]ederal judges are pretty good by and large . . . [O]verall
I find federal judges to be fair and impartial.”).
161. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (“It’s a lit-
tle hard to predict what some of the state court judges will do in a given situation. This is a new
area of law for them.”).
162. See Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney G, supra note 121.
163. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (“[Federal]
juries are not great. And when we win—and more often than not we do win—they give us very
little.”); Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney B, supra note 128 (“[T]he Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania encompasses the five counties including Philadelphia, the four suburban
counties, and parts of three other counties that are not even an exurb, they’re really a lot far-
ther away. And so on a federal jury you could have a few people from Philadelphia, a few peo-
ple from the suburbs, and you could have people from Berks County and Lancaster County
and parts of Lehigh County. . . . If you bring your case in the city and county of Philadelphia in
the state court, your jury is going to be a majority of African Americans. If you bring it in fed-
eral court, your jury—if you have two African Americans on a jury of twelve that’s going to be
a lot.”); Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney D, supra note 121 (“[T]he federal juries
are very difficult.”); Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney E, supra note 54 (“[O]ur
state court juries in Philadelphia are a lot more generous and a lot more, I wouldn’t say dis-
trustful of the police but they call it the way they see it, they’re not going to just believe a police
officer because he or she is a police officer. In federal court, you’re going to get the jury pool
from a lot of different areas that are ‘law and order,’ much more conservative, and their experi-
ence with police officers is overwhelmingly positive.”).
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The Philadelphia attorneys I interviewed have different views about
whether to file civil rights cases against the police in federal or state court.
One attorney brings the bulk of his cases in state court because he prefers
state court juries and likes to avoid litigating qualified immunity.164 Another
attorney prefers federal court because there is less danger the city will deny
indemnification, and prevailing plaintiffs can recover attorneys’ fees.165
Some attorneys file some cases in state court and other cases in federal court,
depending on the plaintiff and the facts of the case. As one lawyer explained:
“[I]f I have an African American plaintiff I don’t want it in federal court if I
can avoid it. On the other hand, if I have . . . a ‘well-heeled,’ white, middle-
class plaintiff, I probably do want it in federal court.”166
Houston. While attorneys litigating against the Philadelphia Police De-
partment consider both state and federal court to be viable options and de-
cide in which court to file based on various considerations about the plaintiff
and the case, attorneys suing the Houston Police Department and its officers
do not consider state court to be an option. Because there are no state law
claims, a plaintiff must allege violations of federal law,167 and if a case is filed
in state court asserting federal causes of action it will almost certainly be re-
moved to federal court.168
Attorneys practicing in Houston have a far dimmer view of the federal
bench than do attorneys practicing in Philadelphia. While plaintiffs’ attor-
neys practicing in Philadelphia consider their federal judges to be fair, attor-
neys practicing in Houston and the Southern District of Texas more
generally consider the federal district and circuit judges to be very hostile to
their claims. As one attorney explained, the Fifth Circuit is “notorious . . . .
[T]hey’re anti-employee, or let’s say they’re pro-employer, and they’re pro-
law enforcement and that’s just the way it is. . . . [T]he majority of federal
judges I find just don’t really desire to hear civil rights cases or employment
cases or anything of that nature.”169
164. See Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney C, supra note 70 (“When we
have a Philadelphia police case, we routinely will file in state court alleging only state torts,
where we don’t have to run up against [qualified immunity]. And we do that for a number of
reasons. First and foremost is we want that Philadelphia jury . . . .”).
165. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney D, supra note 121.
166. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney B, supra note 128.
167. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney A, supra note 54 (“If you
allege a federal cause of action I cannot see any defense attorney that I know ever not removing
that to federal court . . . .”); Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney B, supra note 146
(explaining that if an attorney files a § 1983 case in state court “you just get removed”).
169. Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney A, supra note 54; see also, e.g., Tele-
phone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney B, supra note 146 (“[A] jury and a judge [are] al-
ways going to start out assuming that the officers did the right thing.”); Telephone Interview
with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney F, supra note 151 (“Judges are very deferential in the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals towards police misconduct.”).
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Federal juries in the Southern District of Texas are also considered to be
very hostile to police misconduct claims.170 As one lawyer explained:
[P]articularly in excessive force cases there’s always the attitude of, well, if
the officers use[d] force on them, then they obviously deserved it. So, what
did they—first question that the judge or jury is going to ask is what did
your person do to deserve that? So, there’s—they just err on the side of the
officer, which is extremely difficult.171
Attorneys I surveyed from the Southern District of Texas shared this view.172
To be sure, attorneys who practice in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
report that federal juries can be hostile to civil rights cases as well.173 But,
while four of the forty-four jury trials in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
ended in plaintiffs’ or split verdicts during my two-year study period, none
of the seven trials in the Southern District of Texas resulted in plaintiffs’ ver-
dicts.174 Moreover, lawyers suing Philadelphia police officers have the option
to bring solely state law claims in state court—an option not available to at-
torneys suing Houston police officers.175
C. Defendants
Motion Practice. Attorneys representing Houston and its officers are far
more likely than attorneys representing Philadelphia and its officers to file
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in civil rights cases. During
my two-year study period, there were 21 cases in which Houston defendants
could have moved to dismiss on the pleadings, and they did so in 11 (52.4%)
170. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney D (May 1, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (“Texas citizens really respect the military branches and police
authority. So you got to—you got to kind of deal with those—with those just general percep-
tions by the general public.”); Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney F, supra note
151 (“[The juries in the Southern District of Texas are] very conservative and you’re going to
get mostly, if you have a minority client, you’re going to get a sometimes all-white jury but
most of the time at least you are gonna get one or two minorities at the most on your jury. . . .
They are conservative, they are more conservative than most.”); see also infra note 174 and ac-
companying text.
171. Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney B, supra note 146.
172. Eighteen attorneys who practice in the Southern District of Texas responded to the
survey, and eight of the eighteen reported that juries were among the biggest obstacles to
bringing police misconduct cases. See, e.g., S.D. Tex. Survey 5 (“If the cop doesn’t bloody the
arrestee—juries are more likely to let the cop off.”); S.D. Tex. Survey 10 (“Jurors and judges
trust cops more than citizens. . . .”); S.D. Tex. Survey 16 (“Public attitude is very supportive of
law enforcement.”).
173. See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Survey 8 (“[J]uries are very conservative and usually very support-
ive of their law enforcement, especially after 9/11.”).
174. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 23, at 46 tbl.12. Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit—where Houston is located—is the only circuit that explicitly allows juries to de-
cide officers’ entitlement to qualified immunity at trial. See Reinert, supra note 141, at 2072–77.
175. See supra notes 133–137, 157–159 and accompanying text.
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of those cases.176 Of the 15 cases that proceeded to discovery, defendants
moved for summary judgment in 13 (86.7%). In Philadelphia, in contrast,
there were 254 cases in which defendants could have moved to dismiss on
the pleadings,177 and they did so in 44 (17.3%) cases. Of the 134 cases in
which the parties reached discovery, Philadelphia and its officers filed sum-
mary judgment motions in 57 (42.5%) cases.
Settlement. Cases brought against the City of Houston and its police of-
ficers are far less likely to settle than cases brought against the City of Phila-
delphia and its officers. Of the 25 federal cases filed against Houston and its
officers during my two-year study period, 5 cases (20%) settled. No cases set-
tled before discovery, and each of the 5 settlements was reached after courts
denied defendants’ summary judgment motions. In Philadelphia, in con-
trast, defendants appeared to pay plaintiffs to resolve their claims in 177 of
the 268 (66%) federal cases filed. Philadelphia cases also settled earlier: of the
177 settlements, 106 (59.9%) were entered before discovery;178 45 (25.4%)
were entered during discovery; 8 (4.5%) were entered while summary judg-
ment motions were pending; 16 (9%) were entered after summary judgment;
and 2 (1.1%) were entered during or after trial. Although the docket dataset
does not reveal information about defendants’ settlement offers or negotia-
tions—or the frequency with which defense counsel made prefiling settle-
ment offers179—these data suggest Houston attorneys may be less willing
than Philadelphia attorneys to make attractive settlement offers and less will-
ing to make those offers until the parties have spent time and money on dis-
covery and motion practice.
Indemnification. According to plaintiffs’ attorneys in Philadelphia, the
city’s attorneys sometimes threaten not to indemnify officers but actually re-
fuse to indemnify rarely, “and only in situations where officers have been
criminally charged and removed from the force.”180 The City of Philadelphia
estimates that it indemnifies 99% of officers who have settlements or judg-
ments entered against them.181
Plaintiffs’ attorneys practicing in Houston similarly report that the city
sometimes threatens not to indemnify its officers.182 Houston additionally
176. A total of 25 civil rights suits were filed during the study period, but 4 were dis-
missed by the court before defendants had an opportunity to answer or move to dismiss. For
further discussion of this study and its methodology, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
177. A total of 268 federal cases were filed against the Philadelphia Police Department
and its officers, but 14 were dismissed before defendants could answer or move to dismiss.
178. Of these 106 settlements, 17 were entered before defendants answered, 85 were en-
tered after the answer but before discovery, and 4 were entered while motions to dismiss were
pending.
179. See infra note 204 (describing the possibility of prefiling settlements in Houston and
Philadelphia).
180. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68.
181. See Ravenell & Brigandi, supra note 130, at 868.
182. E.g., Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney F, supra note 151 (“[Houston
attorneys] might mention, you know, ‘Why are you litigating this case? We’re not going to in-
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refuses to indemnify for settlements and judgments over $100,000 per officer
or $300,000 per event.183 Any settlements or judgments over these amounts
need to be collected from the individual officer or the union. One attorney
explained that Houston’s threatened refusals to indemnify and cap on in-
demnification makes it among his “least favorite [places] to litigate
against.”184
D. Counsel
Given that there are fewer obstacles to bringing and prevailing on a civil
rights case against the Philadelphia Police Department, it should come as no
surprise that more attorneys are willing to bring such cases in Philadelphia
than in Houston. My docket dataset from 2011–2012 reveals that 10% of the
federal suits filed against Philadelphia and its officers were litigated without
counsel. In contrast, 24% of the federal suits filed against Houston and its
officers were litigated pro se from beginning to end.
Suits against Philadelphia and its officers were far more often filed by
experienced counsel. Fifty-seven percent (153) of cases filed against Phila-
delphia and its officers were filed by attorneys who had entered three or
more appearances in police misconduct suits in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania during the two-year study period. In contrast, just 12.5% (3) of cases
were filed against Houston and its officers by an attorney with that same lev-
el of civil rights litigation experience.
In Philadelphia, forty attorneys brought three or more federal cases
against law enforcement in the two-year period of my study. Several attor-
neys I interviewed spend the majority of their time litigating civil rights cases
and have been bringing civil rights cases against the Philadelphia Police De-
partment and other government agencies for decades.185 The most estab-
lished civil rights firm in Philadelphia, Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing, Feinberg
& Lin, has been bringing these cases for forty years.186 Several attorneys at
demnify this guy.’ ”). When I asked the City of Houston for records reflecting the frequency
with which they denied officers indemnification over the past ten years, they wrote that they
had no documents responsive to the request. See Email from Gen. Counsel Section, City of
Hous. Legal Dep’t, to author (July 30, 2019, 2:59 PM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
183. HOUS., TEX., CODE ch. 2, art. X, § 2-304 (1985) (“The city shall not pay that portion
of any judgment against a covered person that awards: . . . Exemplary or punitive damages;
or . . . Actual or compensatory damages arising out of a cause of action for official miscon-
duct . . . . Total payments made under this section on behalf of a covered person shall not ex-
ceed $100,000.00 to any one person or $300,000.00 for any single occurrence of personal injury
or death or $10,000.00 for a single occurrence of property damage.”); see also Email from S.
Dist. Tex. Attorney F, Indemnification in Houston (June 12, 2019, 4:59 PM) (on file with the
Michigan Law Review) (confirming this practice).
184. Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney F, supra note 151.
185. See Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, supra note 23, app. tbl.7 (de-
scribing the practice settings and civil rights experience of interviewed attorneys).
186. KAIRYS, RUDOVSKY, MESSING, FEINBERG & LIN, https://www.krlawphila.com/
[https://perma.cc/G4ES-435V].
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the firm teach trial advocacy, civil rights, and other courses at local law
schools, and David Rudovsky, a founding partner, has authored multiple ar-
ticles and a leading treatise about civil rights litigation.187 One attorney at
that firm explained that many civil rights attorneys currently practicing in
Philadelphia have worked with the firm at some point in their careers.188 As
another attorney from the firm explained: “When we started, nobody would
take [civil rights cases]. And now, years later, it’s seen as regular, traditional
litigation. A number of lawyers out there [are] willing to litigate these kinds
of cases.”189 There are also several public interest organizations in Philadel-
phia that work primarily on civil rights cases.190 An attorney described the
Philadelphia civil rights bar overall as “very collegial and we share a lot of in-
formation” about legal strategy.191
In contrast, there is essentially no civil rights bar that regularly brings
cases against officers employed by the Houston Police Department and other
law enforcement agencies in the Southern District of Texas. There were only
four attorneys in all of the Southern District of Texas who entered appear-
ances in three or more police misconduct cases during my two-year study
period. One—a solo practitioner with a general civil practice—filed four cas-
es during the study period but filed no additional civil rights cases before or
since; another of the four is deceased. The other two attorneys—Randall Kal-
linen192 and Christopher Gale193—have each filed dozens of civil rights cases
in the Southern District of Texas over the past several years and identify
themselves on their websites as civil rights attorneys. But only Kallinen has
ever filed suits against Houston and its officers—Gale is based in Corpus
Christi, over 200 miles away.194
Unlike the collegial community of civil rights attorneys in Philadelphia
who share information and strategy, plaintiffs’ attorneys in Houston are rela-
tively isolated. One Houston attorney reported that she could recommend
only one other lawyer who brings these cases, and he is located 240 miles
away, in Dallas.195 Other attorneys also reported knowing no one—or just a
187. See Our Attorneys, KAIRYS, RUDOVSKY, MESSING, FEINBERG & LIN,
https://www.krlawphila.com/firm-attorneys/ [https://perma.cc/2GER-7YXY].
188. See Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68.
189. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney G, supra note 121.
190. See id.
191. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney C, supra note 70; see also Telephone
Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (“[T]here’s . . . a good number of attor-
neys in this district who know how to litigate 1983 cases . . . .”); Telephone Interview with E.
Dist. Pa. Attorney G, supra note 121 (describing the Philadelphia plaintiffs’ bar as “pretty cohe-
sive”).
192. For additional information about Kallinen’s work, see KALLINEN L. PLLC,
https://kallinenlaw.com [https://perma.cc/58Z7-4BUD].
193. For additional information about Gale’s work, see Civil Rights, GALE L. GROUP
PLLC, https://galelawgroup.com/civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/B99X-C5CE].
194. See id.
195. See Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney B, supra note 146.
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person or two—who brings these cases.196 Without an experienced plaintiffs’
bar, there is little ability for less experienced lawyers to receive mentorship
and advice. I asked one lawyer what she would do if she had “questions
about qualified immunity or Monell or something like that” and she re-
sponded: “I can’t think of anybody that I would pick up the phone and call.
Other than [one lawyer] in Dallas.”197
E. Interaction Effects
Every aspect of Philadelphia’s ecosystem is more conducive to civil
rights litigation than Houston’s ecosystem. In Philadelphia, there are more
expansive interpretations of federal causes of action, available state law caus-
es of action, friendlier judges and juries, defense counsel less likely to file
dispositive motions and more likely to settle, and a more robust and experi-
enced plaintiffs’ civil rights bar. Philadelphia lawyers made very clear to me
that police misconduct litigation is still an “uphill battle.”198 But all available
evidence suggests that hill is significantly steeper in Houston.
One way to understand the interaction of these different ecosystem ele-
ments and their impact on civil rights enforcement is to review the number
of civil rights suits filed and case outcomes in each jurisdiction. In 2011–
2012, a total of twenty-five § 1983 cases were filed in federal court against
Houston and its officers. Plaintiffs prevailed in five of these twenty-five cas-
es.199 The City of Houston paid a total of $200,000 to resolve three cases in
which Houston police offers used fatal force against three men ($100,000 in
one case, $90,000 in another case, and $10,000 in a third).200 The City of
Houston paid $2,500 to settle another case, in which an off-duty Houston
police officer, working as a security guard, tackled a wedding guest and
196. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney E (Nov. 10, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review); Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney F, supra note
151.
197. See Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney B, supra note 146.
198. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney E, supra note 54.
199. See Letter from Nerissa Jewett, Senior Paralegal, City of Hous., to author (Aug. 9,
2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (providing responses to public records requests
seeking information about cases filed against the Houston Police Department and its officers in
2011–2012 and the outcomes of those cases). There was one additional case, Alfaro v. City of
Houston, No. H–11–1541, 2013 WL 3457060 (S.D. Tex. July 9, 2013), in which the court en-
tered summary judgment in favor of the City of Houston but granted a default judgment of
$900,000 against the individual officer defendant, who failed to appear. See Alfaro v. City of
Houston, C.A. NO. 11-ev-1541 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2013). The case alleged that the officer
raped four women while on duty. Alfaro, 2013 WL 3457060, at *1. The officer was also crimi-
nally prosecuted, and he is currently serving life in prison. See Jayme Fraser, Ex-HPD Officer
Sentenced to Life in Rape, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.chron.com/news
/houston-texas/article/Ex-HPD-officer-sentenced-to-life-in-rape-3928437.php [https://perma
.cc/4YNY-S4WJ]. I reached out to the plaintiffs’ attorneys in the case to determine whether
they had ever tried to collect on the default judgment, but they did not respond to my requests
for information.
200. See Letter from Nerissa Jewett, supra note 199.
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cracked his teeth on the pavement.201 And the police union paid a total of
$4,000 to settle a case in which an off-duty police officer shot two store and
restaurant patrons, killing one.202
In contrast, 268 cases were brought against the Philadelphia Police De-
partment and its officers in federal court alone, and untold others were
brought in state court during that period.203 A total of 242 state and federal
cases resulted in payments to plaintiffs from the City of Philadelphia totaling
almost $22 million—more than 100 times what the City of Houston paid to
plaintiffs during the same period.204 The only cases in which plaintiffs recov-
ered money against the City of Houston and its officers involved excessive
force, and in all but two of the cases someone died.205 In contrast, almost
20% of the cases settled by the City of Philadelphia were false arrest cases,
and were settled for an average of almost $55,000.206 When shooting cases
brought against the Philadelphia Police Department and its officers settled,
they settled for an average of $720,833 and a total of $8.65 million.207 In con-
trast, when excessive force cases against the Houston Police Department and
its officers settled, they settled for an average of $41,300 and a total of
$206,500.208
Another way to appreciate the interaction of ecosystem elements and
their impact on civil rights enforcement in Philadelphia and Houston eco-
systems is to return to the case with which we began—the person shot fol-
lowing a traffic stop. Such a shooting occurred in Houston. Houston Police
Department Officer Brenton Green pulled over Steven Guidry, an African
201. See id. For the facts of this case, see Tribble v. Lyons, No. 4:11-cv-02833 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 21, 2012) (order granting in part and denying in part motions for summary judgment).
202. For the facts of this case, see Rodriguez v. City of Houston, No. H-12-501, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 114398, at *1–4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2014). For the terms of the settlement, see Mo-
tion to Deposit Money into the Registry of the Court, Rodriguez v. City of Houston, No. 4:12-
CV-00501 (S.D. Tex. July 2, 2015).
203. See Letter from Russell T. Crotts, Assistant City Solicitor, City of Phila., to author
(Jan. 24, 2018) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (providing responses to public records
requests seeking information about cases filed against the Philadelphia Police Department and
its officers in 2011–2012 and the outcomes of those cases). Although the City of Philadelphia
provided me with information about the state court cases in which plaintiffs recovered, it did
not provide information about the total number of cases filed in state court.
204. See id. These figures do not include potentially significant payments made in dis-
putes settled before a lawsuit is filed. See Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney G,
supra note 121 (explaining that approximately half of his cases are settled before a lawsuit is
filed but noting that his practice may be unique in this regard). Note that, when I sought in-
formation from the City of Houston about the number of disputes settled before a lawsuit is
filed, they responded that they had no records responsive to the request. See Email from Gen.
Counsel Section, City of Hous. Legal Dep’t, supra note 182.
205. See Letter from Nerissa Jewett, supra note 199 (identifying the cases settled with
payments to plaintiffs).
206. See Letter from Russell T. Crotts, supra note 203 (identifying the cases settled with
payments to plaintiffs, and the nature of each plaintiff’s claims).
207. See id.
208. See Letter from Nerissa Jewett, supra note 199.
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American man, for a minor traffic violation, then pulled Guidry out of his
car and shot him.209 Officer Green said Guidry resisted and reached into his
waistband; a passenger in the car states Guidry did not resist or struggle, and
no weapon was found in Guidry’s possession.210 The case, Guidry v. Houston,
was brought by an attorney with a general civil practice.211 A search on
PACER indicates that this is the only civil rights case the attorney of record
ever filed. The suit, filed in federal court, alleged § 1983 claims against the
individual officer and the City of Houston.212 In a request for admission,
though, the plaintiff’s attorney responded that he was not pursuing a claim
against the individual officer under § 1983.213 The attorney told me, when I
asked, that he did not recall why he declined to pursue the individual liability
claim but that it “probably . . . ha[d] something to do with qualified immuni-
ty.”214
The plaintiff’s only remaining theory was that the City of Houston
should be held liable because it ratified the shooting after the fact215—one of
several theories of municipal liability, and arguably the most difficult to
prove.216 The plaintiff did not pursue a Monell claim based on Houston’s
failure to train or supervise Officer Green, even though a reporter from the
Houston Chronicle found Green had ten other sustained complaints against
him, “including causing automobile accidents, failing to complete training,
and improper police procedure,” and “us[ing] his nightstick during an un-
provoked attack on ex-NBA player and University of Houston basketball
standout Michael Young, who was making his way through a boisterous
crowd with his two sons.”217 Green was suspended for twenty days without
209. For a description of the facts of this case, see Guidry v. Houston, No. H–11–1589,
2013 WL 211114, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2013), and 1,000+ Cases of Police Brutality in the
United States, GREATER HOUS. COAL. FOR JUSTICE, http://greaterhoustoncoalitionforjustice
.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/1000CasesOfPoliceBrutalityInTheUSA.pdf [https://perma
.cc/8NAJ-5HQD].
210. See 1000+ Cases of Police Brutality in the United States, supra note 209.
211. Firm Overview, SYLVESTER ANDERSON, http://www.sylandlawyer.com/
[https://perma.cc/WR4H-SA3G].
212. Guidry, 2013 WL 211114, at *2.
213. Defendants City of Houston and Officer B. Green’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
The City of Houston, at 17–18, Guidry, 2013 WL 211114 (No. 4:11-cv-01589).
214. Email from Att’y for Plaintiff Steven Guidry to author (June 24, 2019, 12:51 PM) (on
file with the Michigan Law Review).
215. Guidry, 2013 WL 211114, at *3.
216. See World Wide St. Preachers Fellowship v. Town of Columbia, 591 F.3d 747, 755
(5th Cir. 2009) (describing the ratification theory as “limited to ‘extreme factual situations’ ”
(quoting Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 848 (5th Cir. 2009))).
217. Pinkerton, supra note 8. This article was published thirteen months after plaintiff’s
counsel submitted his opposition to summary judgment. It is unclear from the article when
these complaints occurred or were sustained, and some may have occurred after motion prac-
tice was completed. Green’s assault on Michael Young occurred after he shot Guidry but be-
fore Guidry filed his case.
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pay for his attack on Young.218 But the plaintiff did not develop any evidence
of these sustained complaints or their underlying facts to support his Monell
claim and did not present this evidence to the judge. Instead, the plaintiff’s
attorney’s opposition to defendant’s summary judgment motion relied pri-
marily on the department’s internal affairs investigation of the shooting—
which concluded that the shooting was justified—and the testimony of the
plaintiff.219 The plaintiff’s attorney hired a ballistics expert, but did not op-
pose defendant’s motion to exclude the expert at summary judgment.220 The
court found no evidence that the city ratified the shooting and dismissed
Guidry’s claim.221
A similar case arose in Philadelphia.222 Aaron McDaniels, an African
American man, was a passenger in a car that was involved in a crash. When
police arrived at the scene, the driver of the car fled and McDaniels remained
in the car.223 A Philadelphia officer approached the car and fatally shot
McDaniels. The officer asserted that McDaniels opened the passenger door
and pointed a gun at the officer; an eyewitness asserted that the officer
opened the door and McDaniels had nothing in his hands when he was
shot.224 While the Houston plaintiff was represented by a lawyer who had
brought few if any civil rights cases before, the Philadelphia plaintiff was rep-
resented by an experienced civil rights attorney who had brought § 1983 cas-
es for several decades, worked at the preeminent civil rights firm in
Philadelphia, and taught trial advocacy and clinical courses at several law
schools.225 While the Houston attorney could only bring § 1983 claims
against Houston and the officer, the Philadelphia attorney had the choice to
bring federal and state claims in federal court or to bring only state law
claims in state court. The Philadelphia attorney decided to file suit against
the individual officer in state court because the jury pool would be more
“sympathetic.”226 When Philadelphia declared that it would not indemnify
the officer because he was being criminally charged on another matter, the
plaintiff’s attorney had the experience to know to amend the complaint to
218. Id.
219. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants City of Houston and Officer B. Green’s Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, Guidry, 2013 WL 211114 (No. 4:11-cv-01589).
220. See id.
221. Guidry, 2013 WL 211114, at *4.
222. For a description of the facts of the case, see McDaniels v. City of Philadelphia, 234
F. Supp. 3d 637, 640–41 (E.D. Pa. 2017).
223. Id. at 640.
224. See id. at 640–41.
225. See Paul Messing, KAIRYS, RUDOVSKY, MESSING, FEINBERG & LIN,
https://www.krlawphila.com/paul-messing/ [https://perma.cc/KG4U-HEM4].
226. Email from Paul Messing to author (June 7, 2019, 9:17 AM) (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review).
June 2020] Civil Rights Ecosystems 1583
add a municipal liability claim.227 The city then removed the case to federal
court.228
While the attorney in Houston limited his municipal liability claim to a
single theory—ratification—that is considered especially difficult to prove,
the attorney in Philadelphia pursued two different municipal liability theo-
ries: that Philadelphia failed to properly train and supervise officers about
uses of deadly force, and that Philadelphia failed to maintain an effective dis-
ciplinary system.229 The attorney in Houston failed to present compelling ev-
idence of Houston’s failure to supervise or discipline the officer who shot
Guidry. In the Philadelphia case, in contrast, the plaintiff’s attorney support-
ed his municipal liability claims with voluminous evidence, including con-
clusions of a police practices expert who audited the Department’s internal
affairs investigations and reviewed the disciplinary history of the officer in-
volved in the shooting; an extensive report by the Department of Justice that
identified multiple problems with Philadelphia’s use of force policies, train-
ings, and investigations; and a report by the Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment’s own Integrity and Accountability Office, criticizing the quality of the
Department’s internal affairs investigations.230 While the judge in Houston
granted the defendant’s summary judgment motion and dismissed the plain-
tiff’s case, the judge in Philadelphia denied the defendant’s summary judg-
ment motion and the parties settled before trial for $600,000.231
The starkly different litigation and resolution of Guidry and McDaniels
reflect profound differences in the civil rights ecosystems in Philadelphia and
Houston. It is impossible to point to a single factor that explains the diver-
gent paths taken by these two cases. Instead, it is the interaction of multiple
aspects of each ecosystem—including the availability of state law claims, the
dangers of qualified immunity, and the experience of civil rights counsel—
that led to these contrasting results. Differences in the litigation of Guidry
and McDaniels suggest other factors may also have played a role. For exam-
ple, plaintiff’s counsel in McDaniels was able to support his Monell claim
with evidence from a DOJ investigation of police misconduct in Philadelph-
ia; no comparable investigation was conducted in Houston. Plaintiff’s coun-
sel in McDaniels was also able to rely on a report by the Philadelphia Police
Department’s Integrity and Accountability office about use of force practic-
227. See id. (explaining that, after the City threatened not to indemnify the officer, “we
removed the case . . . to federal court so that we could proceed with our only hope: the Monell
claim”).
228. Notice of Removal, McDaniels v. City of Philadelphia, 234 F. Supp. 3d 637 (E.D. Pa.
2017) (No. 2:15-cv-02803).
229. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, McDan-
iels, 234 F. Supp. 3d 637 (No. 2:15-cv-2803).
230. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment at 5–11, McDaniels, 234 F. Supp. 3d 637 (No. 2:15-cv-2803).
231. See McDaniels, 234 F. Supp. 3d 637; Email from E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A to author
(June 7, 2019, 9:43 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (describing settlement terms).
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es; no comparable office exists in Houston.232 Many more characteristics of
the ecosystems in the two cities likely contributed to the results in these cases
and should be explored. But even this preliminary examination has made
clear the ways that multiple factors—federal and state law; judges, lawyers,
and defense counsel; and litigation, settlement, and indemnification practic-
es—combine to make Houston a far less hospitable place than Philadelphia
for a person who believes their civil rights have been violated.
III. FEEDBACK LOOPS
Natural ecosystems are not static collections of animals, plants, and oth-
er matter—instead, they have feedback loops.233 In a forest, water, carbon di-
oxide, and sunlight feed plants. Herbivores eat those plants, and carnivores
eat those herbivores. Decomposing animals enrich the soil. And that soil
nourishes the plants.
Changes to one aspect of a natural ecosystem can prompt changes to
other aspects of the ecosystem. Sometimes, a change to one aspect of an eco-
system prompts a counterbalancing change.234 For example, the Canada
lynx’s favorite prey is snowshoe hare. When the snowshoe hare population
decreases, there is less for lynx to eat and their numbers decline.235 Fewer
lynx means that the snowshoe hare population can grow, and the cycle be-
gins again. Other times, a change to one aspect of an ecosystem can prompt
additional changes in the same direction. In the Amazon, increased defor-
estation—caused by fire, drought, and overfarming—is leading to increased
drought, which is causing still more deforestation.236 While the population of
lynx and snowshoe hare adjust and achieve dynamic equilibrium, the cycle
232. James Pinkerton, Houston’s Police Oversight Group Called a ‘Toothless Watchdog,’
HOUS. CHRON. (Sept. 17, 2016, 9:23 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/Houston-s-police-oversight-group-called-a-9229728.php
[https://perma.cc/JU8Z-PKNA] (describing Houston’s Independent Police Oversight Board as
a “toothless watchdog that isn’t independent and hasn’t performed any public oversight since it
was created five years ago”).
233. See Kathleen C. Weathers et al., Controls on Ecosystem Structure and Function, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOSYSTEM SCIENCE, supra note 13, at 215, 225 (“In highly connected sys-
tems such as ecosystems, interaction pathways often lead to feedbacks. That is, a change in one
part of the system causes a change in another part of the system, which in turn comes back to
affect the original component.”).
234. See id. at 225 (“[F]eedback loops may be short or long, and may be negative (the re-
sponse from the system opposes the initial change) or positive (the response from the system
reinforces the initial change).”).
235. See Charles Elton & Mary Nicholson, The Ten-Year Cycle in Numbers of the Lynx in
Canada, 11 J. ANIMAL ECOLOGY 215, 241–42 (1942).
236. See, e.g., Daniel Nepstad et al., Road Paving, Fire Regime Feedbacks, and the Future
of Amazon Forests, 154 FOREST ECOL. & MGMT. 395, 396–400 (2001); DANIEL NEPSTAD,
WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE, THE AMAZON’S VICIOUS CYCLES 8 fig.1 (2007); Delphine
Clara Zemp et al., Self-Amplified Amazon Forest Loss Due to Vegetation-Atmosphere Feedbacks,
NATURE COMM., Mar. 13, 2017, at 1, 1.
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of deforestation and drought in the Amazon has created imbalance, leading
to reductions in forest health, water availability, and biodiversity.237
Civil rights ecosystems, like natural ecosystems, experience feedback
loops. As constitutional and social movement scholars have long observed,
constitutional rights evolve through feedback between courts, activists, and
other public and private actors: “[C]ourts respond to claims and visions
crafted by movements, and court decisions in turn shape the claims and vi-
sions of those movements and alter the political terrain on which those
movements operate.”238 Here, I am focused more narrowly on the ways in
which shifts in the people, rules, and practices most central to civil rights lit-
igation can impact the ecosystem.
The way in which past civil rights cases have been filed, litigated, and re-
solved will almost certainly affect decisions in future cases. For example, a
plaintiffs’ attorney, who often brings civil rights cases on contingency, is
likely to select cases for which she believes her expected recovery will exceed
her expected costs.239 When making this calculation, the attorney will likely
consider what happened in her past cases and cases brought by her col-
leagues. If an attorney is considering filing a case against an officer employed
by a jurisdiction that has regularly raised qualified immunity and aggressive-
ly pursued interlocutory appeals in the past, the attorney will factor in the
cost of motion practice and a possible appeal when deciding whether a case
makes economic sense to take.240 In these ways, past successes and failures
will inform future filing decisions.
Information from prior cases may also influence case strategy. If a plain-
tiffs’ attorney has the option to file a case in state or federal court, prior deci-
sions by state and federal judges and juries in civil rights cases will inform
her decision. Defense counsel likely make similar strategic decisions based in
part on past litigation. If a plaintiff files a § 1983 case in federal district court,
and courts in the district rarely grant motions to dismiss on qualified im-
munity grounds, defense counsel may be reluctant to spend valuable time
briefing such a motion. If juries have historically entered defense verdicts—
and awarded little to plaintiffs in the rare occasion that they succeed—
defendants may be less likely to make attractive settlement offers to plaintiffs
before trial.
As in natural ecosystems, changes to one aspect of a civil rights ecosys-
tem can prompt a counterbalancing change. For example, some plaintiffs’
attorneys who practice in Oakland, California report that qualified immunity
237. See NEPSTAD, supra note 236, at 4–5. See generally supra note 236.
238. Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 877, 877 (2013) (book review); see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
239. For further discussion of this calculation and the fact that some attorneys vary in
this calculation, see Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, supra note 23, at 1110–11.
240. See id. at 1119, 1125 n.99.
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has become more of a barrier in civil rights cases in recent years.241 Plaintiffs’
attorneys have the option to avoid the challenges associated with qualified
immunity by filing state law claims in state court.242 Some attorneys I inter-
viewed expressed concern that California state court judges are less familiar
with the law relevant to civil rights cases.243 But others consider state court
judges—at least those in Alameda County, where Oakland is located—to be
more sympathetic to plaintiffs than federal judges.244 And if more civil rights
cases are filed in state court, state judges will presumably become more fa-
miliar with the relevant laws. Other aspects of the ecosystem make state
court an attractive alternative. There are no damages caps in California for
state tort claims, and plaintiffs’ attorneys can recover fees when they prevail
on certain state law claims.245 California’s fee-shifting rules are, in fact, more
generous than those applicable to § 1983 claims.246 And state court juries in
Oakland are considered more sympathetic to civil rights plaintiffs than their
federal counterparts.247 So, if qualified immunity makes § 1983 claims
241. E.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney B, supra note 54 (“[T]he law
has become so much more difficult in [the qualified immunity] arena including in terms of
finding a case with identical facts that has previously been decided . . . .”). My data suggest that
qualified immunity is not being raised very often in Oakland cases: in cases filed from 2011 to
2012, Oakland plaintiffs filed twenty-two cases in which qualified immunity could be raised,
and defendants did so in only two cases, at summary judgment. See supra note 23 (explaining
research methodology). Nevertheless, defendants may have begun raising qualified immunity
more recently. And, regardless of what the data show, if plaintiffs’ attorneys believe qualified
immunity has become more of a challenge, it may impact their case selection and filing deci-
sions.
242. See Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney C (Nov. 6, 2017) (on file with
the Michigan Law Review) (reporting that some attorneys are forgoing federal court to avoid
qualified immunity, filing in state court under the Unruh Civil Rights Act or the Bane Act, and
getting attorneys’ fees under California law).
243. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney E (Nov. 17, 2017) (on file
with the Michigan Law Review) (explaining that he prefers federal court because “[t]he judges
don’t have the time or the knowledge in state court”); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal.
Attorney G, supra note 59 (explaining that he prefers to file cases in federal court because state
court judges “are less versed on the law than federal judges are”).
244. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney A, supra note 59 (explain-
ing that there are “a lot of good judges” in Alameda County, as compared to “a lot” of the
Northern District judges and magistrates who “seem to be closely aligned with law enforce-
ment”).
245. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney G, supra note 59 (observ-
ing that plaintiffs’ attorneys can recover a multiplier on attorneys’ fees under California state
law but not under under federal law). Plaintiffs can also recover under a catalyst theory in Cali-
fornia, which is not available under federal law. See, e.g., La Miranda Ave. Neighborhood Ass’n
v. City of Los Angeles, 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338 (Ct. App. 2018). Cf. Buckhannon Bd. & Care
Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 606–10 (2001) (rejecting
application of a catalyst theory for collection of attorneys’ fees for civil rights claims, including
§ 1983 claims).
247. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney A, supra note 59 (describ-
ing Alameda County as having “great jury pools as far as finding liability”); Telephone Inter-
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against Oakland officers increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to bring in federal
court, plaintiffs’ attorneys can increasingly rely on state law claims and
courts and a dynamic equilibrium will be maintained.
In other parts of the country, defendant-friendly changes to one aspect
of the ecosystem may not be counterbalanced by other aspects of the ecosys-
tem. Attorneys I interviewed who practice in Orlando, Florida share the per-
ception that federal district courts are increasingly granting qualified
immunity motions, and that defense counsel have begun raising the defense
more often.248 In response to the challenges posed by qualified immunity,
some plaintiffs’ attorneys in Florida take the same approach as attorneys in
California—they file state law claims in state court. Attorneys report that a
Florida state law claim is easier to prove than a § 1983 claim.249 Some attor-
neys believe state court judges and juries are also more sympathetic.250 Yet
the benefits of state court come at a cost. In Florida, state law damages are
statutorily capped at $200,000, and attorneys’ fees are unavailable.251 While
state law may provide comparable relief for certain types of cases—namely,
view with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney F (Dec. 6, 2017) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (re-
porting that his firm is beginning to file more civil rights cases against the San Francisco Police
Department in state court because they prefer the local juries). Note, though, that lawyers con-
sider local juries in more rural parts of Northern California to be more conservative. See, e.g.,
Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney E, supra note 243; Telephone Interview with
N. Dist. Cal. Attorney G, supra note 59.
248. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney B (Oct. 30, 2017)
(transcript on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“[Qualified immunity motions are] creep-
ing up. I remember a time when . . . qualified immunity did not appear in some motions for
summary judgment. Now it’s coming up in more and more motions to dismiss.”); Telephone
Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney D, supra note 63 (explaining that defendants raise
qualified immunity “every time; even if it’s not valid they’ll take a stab at it; they’ll take a run at
it”). Of the thirteen § 1983 damages actions filed against Orlando police officers from 2011 to
2012, defendants raised qualified immunity in seven—four in motions to dismiss, and three at
summary judgment. In one case, summary judgment was granted and dispositive; in three the
motions were granted on other grounds; and in three the cases settled while the motions were
pending.
249. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney A (Apr. 27, 2017)
(transcript on file with the Michigan Law Review) (“[T]he state claim is a lot easier to prove
than the civil rights claim, because the civil rights standard is so much higher. It’s, you know,
basically, I [have to] show intentional quasicriminal conduct on those to prevail, and the jury
instructions in the Eleventh Circuit standard jury instructions for civil rights cases are just aw-
ful. I mean, it’s almost a miracle if you get past the first question.”).
250. See, e.g., id. (explaining that he considers state judges less hostile to civil rights suits
than federal judges); Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney C, supra note 54
(explaining that federal judges are more likely than state judges to dismiss civil rights suits be-
fore trial); Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney D, supra note 63 (explaining
that the state court judges are “generally more sympathetic” to civil rights cases than federal
court judges “because they don’t see as much of it”).
251. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28(5) (West 2019) (providing that waiver of sovereign im-
munity caps damages awards by any one person at $200,000 and a total award at $300,000); see
also Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney A, supra note 249 (describing the
damages cap as a challenge for state law claims); Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla.
Attorney C, supra note 54 (same).
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low damages cases that would settle in either court without a separate provi-
sion for attorneys’ fees—state law claims do not provide a comparable alter-
native for higher damages cases and cases where separate attorneys’ fees
would be awarded had the case been brought in federal court.252 So, if it be-
comes increasingly difficult to file § 1983 cases against Orlando officers in
federal court, plaintiffs’ attorneys will not be able to rely on state law to vin-
dicate high-value claims.
When shifts to one aspect of an ecosystem are not counterbalanced by
other shifts in the ecosystem, cascading changes can occur. In the Middle
District of Florida, as in the Southern District of Texas, there are few attor-
neys who regularly bring civil rights cases. One Florida attorney recognized
that when he rejected a case, “the chance of them ever finding another law-
yer is zero” because “there’s just a couple of us that even do this.”253 This at-
torney explained that most attorneys bring a few civil rights cases and then
stop after they get “clobbered a couple of times.”254 As he explained, “there’s
only so much money you can lose before you figure out that it’s not the right
way to go.”255 As another attorney explained: “Not many people take these
cases because you really don’t make any money on them. Rarely, you do, but
I look at it as more of a community service, quite frankly.”256 I spoke to one
attorney who has decided to focus primarily on filing small damages cases in
Florida state court.257 But other attorneys consider this approach not to be
worth the time, expense, or risk.258
If it becomes increasingly difficult to file § 1983 claims against Orlando
officers, and state court damages remain capped at $200,000, it makes eco-
nomic sense that even fewer lawyers will be willing to accept civil rights cases
252. For example, in Spann v. Verdoni, a Sarasota County deputy sheriff shot and killed a
twenty-year-old after he and a friend rang the deputy’s doorbell late at night as a prank. Spann
v. Verdoni, No. 8:11-cv-707-T-TBM, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 27, 2012) (order granting sum-
mary judgment). The district court granted the deputy summary judgment on the federal
claims (granting qualified immunity in the alternative) and remanded the state claims to state
court. Id. at *20–30. The decedent’s family’s attorney informed me that his clients “made the
decision not to pursue an action in State court” because the damages cap “severely restrict[ed]
potential damages.” Email from W. Cort Frohlich, Attorney for Plaintiffs in Spann v. Verdoni,
to author (Mar. 2, 2017, 10:15 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). See also, e.g., Tele-
phone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney E, supra note 67 (explaining that he will not
file in state court unless he is bringing a low damages claim).
253. Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney C, supra note 54. Attorneys
who primarily practice in neighboring parts of the Middle District of Florida similarly reported
that there are few or no other lawyers who bring civil rights cases. See, e.g., Telephone Inter-
view with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney D, supra note 63 (“I do not know anybody who’s doing
civil rights in Charlotte County or Lee County or DeSoto County or Manatee County or Sara-
sota County.”).
254. Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney C, supra note 54.
255. Id.
256. Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney A, supra note 249.
257. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney B, supra note 248.
258. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney E, supra note 67.
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on contingency.259 As a result, the civil rights cases that are filed will be
brought predominantly by lawyers who have limited expertise in this very
complicated area of the law. And the scarcity of seasoned civil rights attor-
neys may mean that less experienced lawyers will have nowhere to go for ad-
vice.260 Attorneys without experience or mentors may find it more difficult
to succeed in any given case. These attorneys’ losses may also result in rul-
ings that make the legal terrain even more difficult to navigate. And these
losses and legal setbacks will make it even less likely that attorneys will agree
to represent civil rights plaintiffs in the future.
Cascading changes in the opposite direction can also occur. In Oakland,
as in Philadelphia, there are many experienced attorneys who bring civil
rights cases against the police department and its officers.261 In the Northern
District of California, there were twenty-two attorneys who entered three or
more appearances in police misconduct cases during my two-year study pe-
riod.262 Seven attorneys entered ten or more appearances during this period.
Several attorneys who practice in Oakland report that they have been litigat-
ing civil rights cases for decades.263 Indeed, several attorneys described com-
peting for clients in the Northern District of California.264 If laws, judges,
defense counsel, or juries were to become even more hospitable to civil
rights claims, more lawyers would be willing to accept civil rights cases, more
lawyers would dedicate a sizeable portion of their work to these cases and
become experts in the area, and these lawyers would be able to mentor less
experienced lawyers. As a result, more civil rights cases would be filed by
lawyers with more experience, and that experience would make them more
likely to succeed in any given case and more likely to cause courts to issue
259. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.28 (West 2019); see Telephone Interview with Middle Dist.
Fla. Attorney A, supra note 249; see also Telephone Interview with Middle Dist. Fla. Attorney
C, supra note 54.
260. See supra notes 82, 195–197 and accompanying text.
261. Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney F, supra note 247 (“There’s defi-
nitely a group of attorneys out here who do these cases and do them routinely, and they do
them well.”).
262. Schwartz, Qualified Immunity’s Selection Effects, supra note 23, app. tbl.1.
263. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney A, supra note 59 (report-
ing that he has been litigating civil rights cases for twenty-five years); Telephone Interview with
N. Dist. Cal. Attorney B, supra note 54 (reporting that she has been litigating civil rights cases
for twenty-two years); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney C, supra note 242 (re-
porting that he has been litigating civil rights cases for more than forty years).
264. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney B, supra note 54 (describ-
ing another attorney practicing in the Northern District of California as “a big competitor” for
her, who has brought ten times more police misconduct suits over the past ten years); Tele-
phone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attorney C, supra note 242 (explaining that he used to
bring cases in San Francisco but now brings most police misconduct cases in Sonoma County
and Marin County because “if you’re black in the Bay Area, you got beat up by the police,
you’re probably going to call” another lawyer); Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Cal. Attor-
ney E, supra note 243 (“[T]here’s no end to the number of lawyers that are willing to take civil
rights cases in Oakland.”).
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rulings that would be useful to plaintiffs in future cases.265 Success builds on
itself—and so does failure.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
In this Article, I have offered a framework with which to understand civ-
il rights filings and outcomes—as the product of jurisdictions’ civil rights
ecosystems. The ecosystem analogy has advanced three descriptive claims
about civil rights litigation: that litigation in this area is the product of mul-
tiple interacting people, rules, and practices; that civil rights ecosystems vary
dramatically; and that civil rights ecosystems have feedback loops that can
lead to shifts in their amenability to suits over time. Now, I consider the im-
plications of these observations for courts’ and scholars’ views about the re-
lationship between constitutional rights and remedies, the existence and
desirability of geographic variation in constitutional rights, and the mechan-
ics of change in civil rights protections.
A. Contextualizing the Meaning of Lawsuit Filings and Payouts
Understanding civil rights litigation as the product of ecosystems should
caution against drawing quick conclusions about the practices of govern-
ment officials based on the volume of lawsuits filed against them and pay-
outs in those cases. Commentators regularly assume that filed suits and pay-
payouts reflect the extent and severity of police misconduct. For example, in
a recent study, scholars attempted to assess the effectiveness of Department
of Justice consent decrees in curbing police misconduct by examining the
frequency of § 1983 lawsuit filings, reasoning that “[s]ection 1983 lawsuits
filed against a law enforcement agency should provide a rough proxy for the
public’s satisfaction of its policing practices.”266 Another study tested the
theory that police departments can learn from lawsuits brought against them
by tracking the number of § 1983 cases against some departments that ig-
nore lawsuit data and other departments that regularly gather and analyze
lawsuit data.267 But if the volume of lawsuits and the amount of payouts is
defined in significant part by the state of the law, judges, juries, indemnifica-
tion practices, and the plaintiffs’ bar, lawsuits should not be understood as a
metric of misconduct.268 Indeed, jurisdictions in which very few cases are
265. For evidence that more experienced lawyers are more likely to succeed, see supra
notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
266. See Zachary A. Powell et al., Police Consent Decrees and Section 1983 Civil Rights
Litigation, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 575, 584 (2017).
267. See Randall K. Johnson, Do Police Learn from Lawsuit Data?, 40 RUTGERS L. REC. 30
(2012–2013). It appears that Johnson relied only on “published Section 1983 cases” in his as-
sessment, instead of all cases filed—an approach that has separate reliability problems. Id. at
33. For a discussion of those reliability problems, see Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails,
supra note 23, at 20–21.
268. See Harmon, supra note 65, at 618 (“Section 1983 suits are a poor proxy for consti-
tutional violations (much less for misconduct more generally) because the incidence of civil
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brought may merit even closer inspection—particularly if other available ev-
idence suggests incidents of government violence and overreach are not be-
ing contested in the courts.
B. Contextualizing the Role of Federal Courts and Federal Law
When the Supreme Court crafts constitutional rules, procedural hurdles,
and immunity doctrines, it appears to believe that its rulings operate in a
vacuum to achieve a balance between government and individual inter-
ests.269 Scholarly debate about the scope of constitutional rights and the rela-
tionship between constitutional rights and remedies similarly focuses
primarily on the work of federal courts applying federal law. The Court’s
substantive, justiciability, and remedial rulings undoubtedly influence the
scope of constitutional protections in multiple ways. But this Article makes
clear that federal courts are not acting in isolation: a wide-ranging and inter-
active collection of other people, rules, and practices play a meaningful role
in whether and to what extent civil rights are vindicated.
For example, the Supreme Court has explained that its qualified immun-
ity jurisprudence is intended to balance “two important interests—the need
to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly
suits rises and falls for reasons that are uncorrelated with police conduct.”). Lawsuits are also
poor indications of police behavior because they do not take account of claims filed and re-
solved without resort to litigation. See Aurélie Ouss & John Rappaport, Is Police Behavior Get-
ting Worse? The Importance of Data Selection in Evaluating the Police (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law
Working Paper No. 693, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3325382
[https://perma.cc/ZZ7M-G3KU]; see also supra note 198 and accompanying text.
269. See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1937, 1945 (2018) (“[C]onstitutional doctrine is usually articulated in the form of balanc-
ing tests.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 637 (2006) (“[C]ourts, and especially the
Supreme Court, decide cases by seeking what they regard as an acceptable overall alignment of
doctrines involving justiciability, substantive rights, and available remedies. When facing an
outcome or pattern of outcomes that it regards as practically intolerable or disturbingly sub-
optimal, the Court will adjust or manipulate the applicable law.” (footnote omitted)); Michael
J. Gerhardt, Institutional Analysis of Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 48 DEPAUL L.
REV. 669, 670 (1999) (“[T]he balance at the heart of Monell [is] between protecting the basic
autonomy and financial integrity of city governments and vindicating the federal rights of citi-
zens injured in some fashion by some official municipal action . . . .”); Mayeux, supra note 15,
at 90–91 (“By selecting criminal cases at random from any recent docket, one can encounter
Supreme Court justices writing about the need to balance the ‘social costs’ of enforcing the
Fourth Amendment against the ‘benefits’ and to weigh ‘law enforcement interests’ against the
interests of individuals.” (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016), and Birchfield v.
North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2185 (2016))); James E. Pfander et al., The Myth of Personal Li-
ability: Who Pays When Bivens Claims Succeed, 72 STAN. L. REV. 561 (2020) (describing the
Court’s Bivens doctrine, which attempts to balance the benefits of deterring official misconduct
with concern about the costs of imposing individual liability on federal officials); Joanna C.
Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1652, 1668–1677
(2013) (describing efforts by the Supreme Court in its pleadings, class certification, and sum-
mary judgment decisions to balance plaintiffs’ interests in vindicating their rights with inter-
ests in avoiding discovery and trial in insubstantial cases).
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and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.”270 Scholars have argued that
qualified immunity can create this type of balance by encouraging the filing
of claims seeking prospective relief and allowing judges to expand constitu-
tional rights without imposing damages liability on individual officers.271
Qualified immunity undoubtedly influences civil rights litigation in multiple
ways and affects the extent to which suits can hold public officials accounta-
ble.272 But the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence appears
not to take account of the ways in which the doctrine interacts with other el-
ements of civil rights ecosystems—including the availability of state law
remedies, the financial stability of the jurisdiction, and the strength and so-
phistication of the plaintiffs’ bar—that influence the degree to which quali-
fied immunity achieves its intended goal.273 In a recent qualified immunity
decision, the Court stated that “[w]hatever contractual obligations” the city
that employed the officers “may (or may not) have to represent and indem-
nify the officers are not our concern.”274 But a municipal defendant’s indem-
nification policies are unquestionably relevant to how qualified immunity
balances government and individual interests, and whether qualified im-
munity is, in fact, so important “to society as a whole” that the Court should
take the extraordinary step of “correct[ing] lower courts when they wrongly
subject individual officers to liability.”275
The Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence also fails to recognize that
the impact of qualified immunity on civil rights litigation can vary by region.
As we have seen, qualified immunity doctrine plays a more significant role in
§ 1983 suits filed in Houston than it does in § 1983 suits filed in Philadelph-
ia.276 This difference has partially to do with distinctions among the federal
270. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
271. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking the Right Questions About Officer Immunity,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 480 (2011); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 99–100 (1999).
272. For discussions of the impact of qualified immunity on case filings and dispositions,
see Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, supra note 23, and Schwartz, Qualified Immuni-
ty’s Selection Effects, supra note 23. For discussion of the effects of qualified immunity doctrine
on police accountability, see Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1814–20.
273. The Court’s qualified immunity decisions also appear not to take account of the
doctrine’s interaction with other rules of the Court’s own creation, including pleading and
summary judgment standards and the unavailability of qualified immunity for Monell claims
and cases seeking injunctive relief. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55
EMORY L.J. 229, 231 (2006) (“[T]he Court either consciously ignores or fails to comprehend
the unavoidable tension between early termination of civil rights suits and the inherently fact-
based nature of the reasonableness inquiry that lies at the heart of qualified immunity’s analyt-
ical framework.”); Schwartz, supra note 40, at 1810–11 (discussing the relationship between
qualified immunity doctrine and summary judgment standards).
274. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 n.3 (2015).
275. Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)).
276. See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text.
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judges in both jurisdictions who interpret and apply qualified immunity.277
This difference may also have to do with distinctions in the ways in which
qualified immunity doctrine has developed in the circuits.278 And this differ-
ence may have to do with the way federal courts in Houston and Philadelph-
ia interpret other legal rules governing pleadings, the entitlement to
discovery, how to treat disputed issues of fact at summary judgment, and the
scope of constitutional rights.279 But qualified immunity also plays less of a
role in Philadelphia than in Houston because defense counsel in Philadelph-
ia are less likely to raise qualified immunity—particularly in motions to dis-
miss—knowing that the motion will almost certainly be denied and are more
likely to settle before summary judgment. Qualified immunity likely plays
less of a role in Philadelphia because Philadelphia has more experienced civil
rights attorneys who know how to defeat qualified immunity motions when
they arise. And qualified immunity almost certainly plays less of a role in
Philadelphia than in Houston because Philadelphia plaintiffs can file state
law claims, and Houston plaintiffs cannot. As a result, qualified immunity
doctrine currently serves very different functions in Houston’s and Philadel-
phia’s ecosystems. The Court’s qualified immunity decisions—intended to
balance interests in official accountability with interests in protecting offi-
cials against insubstantial claims—produce a different type of balance de-
pending on where one lives.
A similar critique can be made of other doctrines.280 The Court repeat-
edly assumes that the scope of constitutional rights and the relationship be-
tween rights and remedies are direct results of federal judges’ application of
federal law.281 In reality, federal doctrine is but one component in an expan-
sive collection of people, rules, and practices that interact. Because the Court
overlooks the other components of civil rights ecosystems, it cannot appreci-
ate how its doctrines operate within the broader civil rights landscape.
C. Understanding the Scope and Causes of Constitutional Variation
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly and confidently assert-
ed that the protections in the Bill of Rights apply consistently across the
country. Justice Jackson wrote that “[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them
as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”282 Although the Court has
recognized that “[c]ommunities vary . . . in many respects,” it has concluded
that “such variances have never been considered to require or justify a vary-
277. See supra notes 160, 169 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 143–144, 151–154 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 269.
281. See infra notes 282–284 and accompanying text.
282. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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ing standard for application of the Federal Constitution. . . . It is, after all, a
national Constitution we are expounding.”283 Most recently, in Nieves v.
Bartlett, the Court explained that its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fo-
cuses on objective evidence instead of an officer’s subjective state of mind in
part because to do otherwise would “compromise evenhanded application of
the law by making the constitutionality of an arrest ‘vary from place to place
and from time to time’ depending on the personal motives of individual of-
ficers.”284
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s assumptions, the protections offered
by the Constitution do vary significantly from place to place and from time
to time. This variation is not simply the product of circuit splits about how
to assess the reasonableness of force and other doctrines that could be re-
solved by the Court if it so chose. It is also the product of multiple fluid, sub-
tle, largely unnoticed, interacting factors far beyond the Court’s purview.
This variation has important consequences for the individuals and govern-
ment officials directly involved in any given interaction: allegations of police
violence that might result in a six-figure settlement in Philadelphia might
never be brought as a lawsuit in Houston.285 It can also have important con-
sequences for the development of the law in each jurisdiction. As Pam Kar-
lan has observed, “[t]he kinds of cases that can or are likely to be litigated . . .
powerfully affect which areas of constitutional law get full elaboration and
which are left only loosely construed.”286 This Article reveals that the kinds
of cases likely to be litigated, and the areas of constitutional law likely to be
fully elaborated, depend upon jurisdiction and region.
To some, the fact of regional variation in constitutional protections will
be old news. As Mark Rosen has explained, “geographical nonuniformity of
constitutional requirements and proscriptions is a mainstay of American
constitutionalism.”287 Regional variation is attributable to the nature of judi-
cial review: the Supreme Court’s small docket means that circuit differences
in the interpretations of constitutional principles can persist for decades.288
Other regional variation results from the structure of constitutional protec-
tions. Certain constitutional protections, like the First Amendment’s protec-
tion of speech and expression, are lessened in certain areas—including
283. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194–95 (1964); see also Smith v. United States, 431
U.S. 291, 312–13 n.5 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Jacobellis, 431 U.S. at 194–95).
284. 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1719 (2019) (quoting Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 154
(2004)).
285. See supra Section II.E (describing the different outcomes of the Guidry and McDan-
iels cases, and the cases filed in Houston and Philadelphia).
286. Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1915 (2007).
287. Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitu-
tional Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1999).
288. See Logan, supra note 44.
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military bases, airports, schools, and territorial borders.289 The interpretation
of other constitutional provisions requires courts to apply local norms and
state laws, essentially mandating local variation.290 Geographic variation in
constitutional protections has also been attributed to nonjudicial actors, in-
cluding, in the criminal context, the priorities of local prosecutors291 and
funding levels for local public defenders’ offices.292 This Article offers anoth-
er example of regional variation—in the relationship between civil rights and
remedies—and explication of the ways in which that regional variation is
produced—through the interaction of wide-ranging factors that coexist in
civil rights ecosystems.
Regional variation in the nature and scope of constitutional protections
is not necessarily a bad thing. Although the shadow of slavery and Jim Crow
long made federalism seem at odds with civil rights protections, there is a
growing belief that localism can advance civil rights.293 Some have focused
on the ways in which the judicial interpretation of constitutional protections
can be tailored to community interests and priorities.294 Others have focused
on the articulation of community interests through administrative rulemak-
289. See Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 127 (2013); Logan, supra
note 85, at 379–80 (describing limitations on Fourth Amendment rights at the nation’s bor-
ders, in “high crime area[s],” schools, military bases, and tribal lands); Rosen, supra note 287,
at 1152–61 (describing variation in constitutional protections on military bases, tribal lands,
and schools).
290. See, e.g., Blocher, supra note 289, at 125–26 (observing that the definition of ob-
scenity incorporates local community standards, and the meaning of property protected by the
Due Process and Takings clauses depends on state law); Logan, supra note 93 (observing that
federal criminal procedure rights depend upon the content of state and local criminal laws);
Rosen, supra note 287, at 1149–52 (describing the community standards doctrine in First
Amendment obscenity cases).
291. See, e.g., G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey’s Omission: The Racial Geography of Retribution,
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 65 (2012).
292. For a study demonstrating varying funding levels for public defenders’ offices and
the links between funding and constitutional protections, see Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan,
Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219
(2010).
293. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 46 (2010) (“[Nationalists’ concerns about federalism include] a worry that local power
is a threat to minority rights . . . [and a] fear that state decisions that fly in the face of deeply
held national norms will be insulated from reversal. Both find their strongest examples in the
tragic history of slavery and Jim Crow.”).
294. For scholarship applauding localism in constitutional interpretation, see Laura I.
Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1413, 1418 (2017) (“Democratic localism is essential for the proper functioning of the
criminal system because the criminal justice principles embodying substantive constitutional
norms can only be defined through community interactions at the local level.”); Dan M. Kahan
& Tracey L. Meares, Foreword, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153,
1184 (1998) (asserting that constitutional regulation of policing should reflect “the values and
insights of the communities in which such policing is taking place”); and Andrew E. Taslitz,
Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American Poor, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
277, 279 (2010) (“Fourth Amendment law should vary based on geographic concerns.”).
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ing.295 Whether through the courts or rulemaking, scholars have increasingly
viewed constitutional localism as a means to empower minority groups296
and advance community interests.297 I favor some ongoing efforts to engage
community members in the tailoring of constitutional protections and
rules.298 But understanding localities as civil rights ecosystems, and seeing
some of those ecosystems at work, also raises cause for concern.
Scholars appear to believe that modern-day localism will protect against
the evisceration of constitutional protections299—and that “local decisions
that ‘fly in the face’ of national or state norms can be reversed.”300 I am skep-
tical. I do not claim to know precisely where the constitutional floor lies. But
civil rights ecosystems in parts of the country appear to leave some constitu-
tional rights completely unprotected.301 Lack of data makes it impossible to
295. For scholarship focused on community norms expressed through administrative
rulemaking processes, see Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827 (2015); Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1167
(2000) (“By expounding guidelines in an open forum, subject to public commentary and de-
bate, law enforcement . . . empowers the citizenry through sharing information and collaborat-
ing on appropriate policing principles.”); and Christopher Slobogin, Policing as
Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (2016) (recommending that police policies be crafted
through administrative rulemaking processes and assessed by courts for compliance with those
processes).
296. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A New Progressive Federalism, DEMOCRACY J., Spring
2012, at 37, 41 (“Minority rule can promote both the economic and political integration of ra-
cial minorities.”).
297. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Commentary, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51
DUKE L.J. 377, 382 (2001) (“There is a value in ensuring that local jurisdictions have the discre-
tion to make the decisions that their residents wish them to make . . . includ[ing] more partici-
patory and responsive government; more diversity of policy experimentation; more flexibility
in responding to changing circumstances; and more diffusion of governmental power, which
in turn checks tyranny.”); see also David. J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Lo-
cal Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1999); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Decid-
ing, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine
and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004).
298. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Poli-
cymaking, 96 TEX. L. REV. 891, 947–49 (2018) (describing various efforts by local governments
to engage communities in police policymaking and oversight).
299. See, e.g., David J. Barron, Essay, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing
the Constitution, 115 YALE L.J. 2218, 2234 (2006) (explaining that “there is little risk that a city
will remain a scofflaw for long” because residents can bring taxpayer actions against cities for
violating the law); Gerken, supra note 297, at 46–47 (“Federalism of old involved states’ rights,
a trump card to protect instances of local oppression. Today’s federalism involves a muscular
national government that makes policy in virtually every area that was once relegated to state
and local governments. The states’ rights trump card has all but disappeared, which means that
the national government can protect racial minorities and dissenters when it needs to while
allowing local forms of power to flourish.”).
300. Blocher, supra note 289, at 130.
301. Some might believe that plaintiffs in other parts of the country are being overcom-
pensated—paid substantial sums for insubstantial allegations. In some cities, city attorneys’
offices have perennially pledged to be more aggressive in court and settle fewer civil rights cas-
es as a means of discouraging lawyers from filing weak claims. See, e.g., Alan Feuer, The Law-
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know how often Houston police officers search or arrest someone without
probable cause, and how often they use nondeadly force. But if the lawsuit
filings during the course of my two-year study are representative of litigation
trends in Houston more generally, these violations are not being redressed
by the civil justice system. Over those two years, in a city with more than 2.2
million residents and 5,200 sworn law enforcement officers, a total of 25
suits alleging constitutional violations by Houston officers were filed, no
plaintiffs who alleged false arrests or wrongful searches received any com-
pensation, and only one person was compensated for nondeadly force.
Some might take the position that residents of Houston can decide to
eviscerate constitutional protections against unlawful search and seizure and
nondeadly force to advance other community goals.302 Before endorsing the
elimination of federally protected rights in Houston, however, we should
have clear evidence that that is, in fact, what the community has intended to
do.303 Yet, the confluence of factors that cuts off remedies for people whose
rights have been violated does not appear to be the product of deliberate
community engagement. Indeed, residents of Houston appear to be calling
for more police accountability, not less.304
yers Protecting N.Y.P.D. Play Hardball. Judges Are Calling Them Out., N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/nyregion/nypd-lawyers.html [https://perma.cc
/UJF7-SP22] (quoting the attorney running the Special Federal Litigation Unit of the New
York City Law Department as saying that the “days are done” where plaintiffs’ attorneys can
“hang up a shingle, file a lawsuit [against the city’s police officers] and get a few bucks”); Tele-
phone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney A, supra note 68 (“[T]here was a time when the city
[of Philadelphia] was more interested in early and even presuit resolution of claims. . . .
[T]hey’re no longer that interested in doing that . . . because there’s a lot of claims brought and
a lot of them are pro se or brought by lawyers who are bringing frivolous claims, and they’re
overwhelmed by them.”).
302. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 287, at 1192 (arguing that communities should be able to
constrain their constitutional rights when doing so would advance that community’s goals).
303. For more general concerns about the ability of local governments to reflect commu-
nity interests, see Alafair S. Burke, Unpacking New Policing: Confessions of a Former Neighbor-
hood District Attorney, 78 WASH. L. REV. 985, 1005 (2003) (“[E]very community, however
defined, has its outsiders ‘whose complaints are least likely to be heard by the rest of the com-
munity.’ ”); David Cole, Foreword, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to
the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1087 (1999) (“[T]o defer to ‘the com-
munity’ means simply to favor the majority’s interests over the minority’s within that commu-
nity, hardly a principled way to resolve a constitutional dispute.”); and Logan, supra note 85, at
375 (“The benefits of experimentalism . . . hinge on the wherewithal of policy makers and the
subject matter in question. Local governments number in the tens of thousands and vary sig-
nificantly in their capabilities and resources.” (footnote omitted)).
304. See, e.g., Editorial, As Houston Police Scandal Widens, the Stakes Couldn’t Be Higher,
HOUS. CHRON. (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials
/article/As-Houston-police-scandal-widens-the-stakes-13675018.php [https://perma.cc/B68Q-
UUQY]; St. John Barned-Smith & Keri Blakinger, Protestors Demand Murder Charge Against
Cop Involved in Pecan Park Drug Bust, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 18, 2019),
https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Protesters-to-demand-murder-
charge-against-cop-13625260.php [https://perma.cc/T5SR-YBK3].
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Scholars imagine that Houston’s underenforcement of constitutional
rights might be remedied any number of ways—individuals could bring tax-
payer actions, the federal government could step in, or dissatisfied residents
could decide to leave.305 But safeguards imagined by proponents of localism
do not appear to be working. I have already shown that civil litigation is not
meaningfully protecting federal constitutional rights. Even when the federal
government is its most engaged in the enforcement of civil rights, it only has
resources to investigate a small handful of jurisdictions.306 And the notion
that dissatisfied residents would leave Houston is unrealistic—particularly
given that moving to another jurisdiction in the Southern District of Texas
will not change the jury pool, judges, or limits on state court relief. Moving
farther away will not necessarily work either: the civil rights ecosystem in the
Northern District of Texas is, reputedly, even more hostile to civil rights.307
D. Moving Forward
Finally, this Article offers insights about the ability to effectuate changes
in civil rights protections. When designing substantive, procedural, and re-
medial rules, courts, legislators, and scholars must reckon with the fact that
the balance between individual and government interests is influenced by
multiple factors and cannot be controlled by any one participant in the civil
rights ecosystem.308 Changes to legal rules can undoubtedly impact the vol-
ume and success of civil rights litigation. But those changes may trigger un-
expected adjustments to other aspects of civil rights ecosystems and will like-
likely have different impacts in different ecosystems.
My point is not that courts should stop interpreting the law, legislators
should stop making law, or scholars should stop imagining how the law
could be improved. But each should recognize their decisions and proposals
will not operate in a vacuum and should be skeptical of their ability to craft
generally applicable rules that achieve particular policy ends. Some Supreme
Court justices have observed that the Court should not adjust immunities to
reflect “freewheeling policy choice[s]” because immunity doctrines should
reflect common-law principles.309 This Article offers another reason to cau-
305. See supra note 299.
306. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 448
(describing resources limitations in the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division during
the Obama Administration).
307. See Telephone Interview with S. Dist. Tex. Attorney B, supra note 146 (describing
the Northern District of Texas as a “nightmare”—“[w]ay worse” than the Southern District of
Texas).
308. See Mayeux, supra note 15, at 91 (“Judges who make decisions on the basis (even
subconsciously) of some imagined responsibility to the police, mediated through the imagined
systemic effects of their rulings, are likely to estimate those effects wrongly and to err in one
direction or another.”).
309. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870–71 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
in the judgment) (alteration added by Court) (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 363
(2012)).
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tion against the Court’s efforts to adjust immunities and other doctrines to
achieve what the justices consider to be the appropriate balance between
government and individual interests—such adjustments are unlikely to suc-
ceed with any precision and will not have a consistent impact.
Understanding civil rights litigation as the product of civil rights ecosys-
tems also makes clear that the ecosystems in Philadelphia and Houston, and
in other parts of the country, are not set in stone. Just as feedback loops in
natural ecosystems can be exploited to promote biodiversity and conserva-
tion, advocates and government officials can endeavor to change their civil
rights ecosystems by adjusting various components—indemnification rules,
damages caps, community engagement around police accountability, or the
strength of the plaintiffs’ bar.
One civil rights attorney I interviewed is bringing civil rights cases in
parts of the country without an active plaintiffs’ bar as part of an effort to
create this type of positive feedback loop. He described bringing a multimil-
lion-dollar wrongful conviction case in a jurisdiction that had not previously
had large judgments in civil rights cases:
[T]hey were telling us that in that federal courthouse nobody had ever won
more than a couple million dollars in any civil rights case. Now that we just
got a big verdict, maybe some people are going to say, “Hmm, I should look
at this case a little harder,” once these cases come across their desk.310
With more attorneys willing to take civil rights cases, that jurisdiction may
develop a more experienced civil rights bar; with a more experienced civil
rights bar, there may be more civil rights victories; and those civil rights vic-
tories may lead to changes in other aspects of the ecosystem—defense coun-
sel’s litigation practices, state and federal judges’ decisions, and legal rules
governing these cases. Remember, forty years ago no one was bringing civil
rights cases in Philadelphia and now “it’s seen as regular, traditional litiga-
tion.”311
Although a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in a wrongful conviction
case may be the first step toward making a civil rights ecosystem more con-
ducive to claims against government actors—as this civil rights attorney
hopes—such a verdict might also inspire further limitations on plaintiffs’
rights that endeavor to maintain the status quo. The impact of any given ad-
justment to a civil rights ecosystem will depend on its interaction with other
aspects of that ecosystem.
Take indemnification limits, for example. In Houston, indemnification
limits of $100,000 per officer and $300,000 per event are among many fac-
tors—including unsympathetic federal judges and juries, the unavailability of
state law causes of action, and various substantive and procedural barriers to
relief—that appear to have dampened Houston attorneys’ appetites for
bringing civil rights cases. But if Philadelphia’s city council considered pass-
310. Telephone Interview with N. Dist. Ohio Attorney E, supra note 53.
311. Telephone Interview with E. Dist. Pa. Attorney G, supra note 121.
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ing a resolution similarly limiting indemnification, its robust plaintiffs’ bar
would likely take aggressive action in opposition to the proposed resolution.
Philadelphia’s police officials and union representatives would also likely re-
sist such a measure. Why? Because multiple aspects of Philadelphia’s ecosys-
tem—judges, juries, state and federal laws, and defendants’ litigation and set-
settlement decisions—make Philadelphia more amenable than Houston to
civil rights cases. Ten times more lawsuits were filed against Philadelphia
and its officers than were filed against Houston and its officers during my
two-year study, and plaintiffs received one hundred times more than Hou-
ston plaintiffs in these cases312—regularly in settlements and judgments that
exceed Houston’s indemnification limits. If Philadelphia adopted Houston’s
indemnification limits, some Philadelphia plaintiffs’ attorneys might be dis-
couraged from pursuing high-damages civil rights cases.313 But Philadelphia
officers and their union representatives would have good cause to fear that
some members of Philadelphia’s sizable and experienced plaintiffs’ bar
would continue bringing civil rights cases, that Philadelphia’s sympathetic
juries would continue to render verdicts above the indemnification limits,
and that Philadelphia attorneys might pursue satisfaction of some of those
awards against individual officers.314
Key to any effort to change a civil rights ecosystem, therefore, should be
examining its various component parts and the ways in which they interact,
recognizing that different ecosystems will respond to the same reform in dif-
ferent ways, and watching for the feedback effects that will almost inevitably
occur. Scientists have studied the reduction of deforestation in the Brazilian
Amazon to understand which strategies should be credited for environmen-
tal improvements and how those strategies can be used to reduce deforesta-
tion in other parts of the world.315 This same type of examination is
necessary to better understand the mechanics of civil rights ecosystems
across the country and the levers of change.316
312. See supra notes 199–200, 203–204 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 111–113 and accompanying text (describing Cleveland attorneys’
reluctance to file suits against East Cleveland and its officers because the city does not have
resources to satisfy settlements and judgments).
314. For further discussion of plaintiffs’ attorneys and law enforcement representatives’
shared interest in broad indemnification of officers, see Joanna C. Schwartz, Qualified Immuni-
ty and Federalism All the Way Down, 109 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Michi-
gan Law Review).
315. See Doug Boucher et al., Brazil’s Success in Reducing Deforestation, TROPICAL
CONSERVATION SCI. (Aug. 1, 2013), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177
/194008291300600308 [https://perma.cc/2HCA-GBQN]; see also WEATHERS ET AL., supra note
13, at 11 (explaining that understanding the mechanics of change in natural ecosystems is “a
major part of contemporary ecosystem science”).
316. For a similar observation, see Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Jumping Bunnies and Legal
Rules: The Organizational Sociologist and the Legal Scholar Should Be Friends, in THE NEW
CRIMINAL JUSTICE THINKING, supra note 15, at 246, 267 (“[R]eform activities benefit from so-
ciological investigation . . . not only careful documentation of the space between law on the
books and law in action but also attentive analysis of the precise factors that shape how front-
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CONCLUSION
Each year, tens of millions of people interact with the police; more than
a thousand are killed;317 hundreds of thousands believe that officers use ex-
cessive force; and millions believe they have been treated improperly while
being stopped, searched, or arrested.318 Whether people seek redress for vio-
lations of their civil rights and whether they succeed surely depends in part
on the nature and context of their interaction with the police. But whether
people seek redress for violations of their rights and whether they succeed
also depends in significant part on the civil rights ecosystem in which the
claims arose.
Plenty more can and should be done to understand other factors that
help determine whether civil rights claims are ever filed or successful. More
can be done to understand what causes police violence and misconduct and
how police behavior influences and is influenced by courts, local govern-
ments, and activists.319 Much more can also be done to explore variation in
civil rights ecosystems around the country and around the world.320 In the
meantime, judicial and scholarly discussion about the relationship between
constitutional rights and remedies, and the promise of constitutional local-
ism, should recognize that a multitude of people, rules, and practices interact
to constrain and enhance civil rights protections. Although it is difficult to
study these factors, and nearly impossible to generalize about them, they play
critically important roles in shaping the terrain.
line legal actors come to understand law on the books in the first instance. If we fail to account
for what they are doing with the legal rules and tools at their disposal, then reform activities
will be plagued by unintended consequences . . . .”).
317. The Counted, supra note 9.
318. In their most recent survey of police-public contacts, the Bureau of Justice Statistics
found that 30.2 million people had police-initiated contact within the past year, that 3.3%
(996,465) of those people experienced nonfatal force, and that 48.4% (482,289) considered that
force to be excessive. ELIZABETH DAVIS & ANTHONY WHYDE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ251145, CONTRACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 16
(2018). (Because the study focused only on nonfatal uses of force, these figures exclude people
shot by the police, and those who were killed by the police.) The study also found that of the
19.2 million residents who had been stopped while a driver of a vehicle over the past year,
more than 3.1 million believed the police acted improperly. Id. at 4, 11. The study additionally
found that of the 2.5 million residents who had been stopped on the street, approximately 40%
(one million) believed the stops were illegitimate and 19% (475,000) believed the officers be-
haved improperly. Id. at 4, 14.
319. See supra notes 27–37 and accompanying text for important areas of further inquiry.
320. For exploration of some of these types of questions in the international context, see
Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005) (examining legal
spatiality in the international justice system).
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